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I.

INTRODUCTION

Final orders, judgments and decrees of a bankruptcy court may not be
appealed directly to the circuit court of appeals but must first go through
an intermediate appellate stage. Until recently, the Ninth Circuit was
alone in using bankruptcy appellate panels (BAPs) to provide an
intermediate level of review between the bankruptcy trial court and the
circuit court of appeals. In all other circuits (except briefly in the First
Circuit) the route to circuit court review lay through the district court.
Now, however, BAPs have expanded into the First, Second, Sixth,
Eighth and Tenth Circuits. 1 Controversy attends the BAPs. Specifically, the expansion will likely inflame a long-standing quarrel over the
precedential value of BAP decisions. This paper addresses that issue and
proposes a solution which addresses the concerns of all sides.
BAPs are strange courts. They shake up the normal hierarchical
structure dear to many attorneys' hearts. At first glance, they look like
circuit courts of appeals: they hear appeals, sit in panels of three, review
findings of fact for clear error only, and focus on a de novo review of
the law. But look again and they take on aspects of a district court: they
serve the same intermediate appeal function in the bankruptcy appeals
process as district courts and are themselves subject to review by the
circuit court. On yet a third examination they appear clearly subordinate
to the district courts: not only do the district judges decide whether to
allow BAPs in their districts at all, but BAPs are composed of Article
I bankruptcy judges who are by statute mere "units" of the district courts

1. Per a LEXIS search, in 1997 the First Circuit BAP issued 19 opinions, the
Second and Tenth Circuit BAPS each issued 13 opinions, and the Sixth and Eighth
Circuit BAPs each issued 32 opinions. Note that not all decisions reported on LEXIS
are considered published.
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and who, for better or worse, are typically seen as "inferior" to Article
III judges in the judicial hierarchy.
This multifariousness of status and function has contributed to multiple
views of how BAP opinions should be received by other courts. Courts
are sharply divided over the extent to which principles of stare decisis
should apply to BAP decisions. Most say that BAP decisions are
binding precedent on all bankruptcy courts within a circuit.2 However,
some say that BAP decisions do not bind any bankruptcy court.3 Still
others attempt a compromise and say that BAP decisions bind some but
not all bankruptcy courts. 4
Bankruptcy judges are not the only ones who disagree on this issue.
The ink of commentators also spills in all directions. 5 Add to this
confusion the questions of what effect BAP opinions should have on
district courts and circuit courts, and one can easily understand why the

2. E.g., Muskin v. Industrial Steel (In Re Muskin), 151 B.R. 252 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1993) (Jaroslovsky, J.); In re Thunderbird Inn, 151 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993)
(Nielsen, J.); Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination), 149 B.R.
614 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (Bufford, J.); In re General Associate Investors Ltd., 150
B.R. 756 (Bankr. D. Ariz.) (Mooreman, J.); Philadelphia Life Ins. v. Proudfoot (In re
Proudfoot), 144 B.R. 876 (B.A.P. 9th Cir 1992) .(Jones, Russell, Ashland, JJ. writing per
curiam); In re Windmill Farms, 70 B.R. 618 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (Mooreman,
Ashland, Elliot, JJ.), rev'd on other grounds 841 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988).
3. E.g., In re Standard Brands Paint, 154 B.R. 563 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993)
(March, J.); In re Rheuban, 128 B.R. 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (Zurzado, J.).
4. E.g., Oregon Higher Educ. Assistance Found. v. Selden (In re Selden), 121
B.R. 59, 62 (D. Ore. 1990) (BAP decisions bind only those bankruptcy courts sitting in
the district out of which the appeal arose); see also In re Junes, 76 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1987) (Hess, J.), aff'd on other grounds, 99 B.R. 978 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989)
(Mooreman, Ashland, Jones, JJ.).
5. Kathleen P. March & Rigoberto V. Obregon, Are BAP Decisions Binding on
Any Court?, 18 CAL. BANKR. J. 189 (1990) (neither BAP nor district court decisions
should bind any court); Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved
Issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or An Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 529-32
(1995) (same); cf Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063 (1994) (both BAP and district court decisions
should bind bankruptcy courts); cf Jeffrey J. Brookner, Note, Bankruptcy Courts and
Stare Decisis: The Need for Restructuring, 27 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 313 (1993) (BAP
decisions should bind bankruptcy courts but district court decisions should not); see also
David A. Levin, Note, Precedent and the Assertion of Bankruptcy Court Autonomy:
Efficient or Arrogant?, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 185 (1995); cf Gordon Bermant & Judy B.
Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIZ. STATE
L.J. 181 (1989) (empirical study concludes that as matter of fact BAP opinions are
accorded great respect by attorneys and judges).
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National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC) has proposed to
eliminate this court of many guises. 6
When one studies the matter it becomes easy to understand the
profusion of plausible positions: the question of a BAP decision's
precedential effect involves the interplay of both the judicial doctrine of
stare decisis and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
Separately, these doctrines lead in opposite directions. The principles of
stare decisis support treating BAP decisions as binding precedent akin
to circuit court opinions, but the principles of separation of powers cut
against such treatment. Unless these doctrines can be blended, the
question will continue to confound. Although one way around the
problem is to abandon the BAPs as the NBRC proposes, I shall argue
that the BAPs serve a valuable purpose and should be retained. Building
upon insights contained in Judge Bufford's imaginative opinion in In re
Globe Illumination,7 I suggest that the BAPs can be integrated into the
traditional hierarchical appellate structure so as to reconcile the
competing concerns underlying these two doctrines without requiring one
to yield to the other.
Part I will explain how the current structure of the bankruptcy
appellate system should be understood in terms of the history behind the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the constitutional concerns
articulated by the Supreme Court in the Marathon Pipe Line case. 8 Part
II will examine the doctrine of stare decisis and will explore the policies
and principles which support the doctrine, as well as those which
undercut it. Part III will first demonstrate that, solely because of the
principles, behind stare decisis, BAP decisions should bind both
bankruptcy and district courts within circuit. Part III will then show
why this result is not violative of the concerns about constitutional
separation' of powers which underlay Marathon and subsequent
decisions. Finally, Part IV will argue against the abandonment of the
BAPs currently proposed by the NBRC. Instead, I suggest an appellate
structure which will, whether Congress gives bankruptcy judges Article
III status or not, eliminate the existing intermediate level of review, and
at the same time preserve the valuable and unique contributions BAPs
can make to the development of a uniform national bankruptcy law.

a

6. Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, National Bankruptcy Review Conunission Final Report, October 20, 1997, Ch. 3.1.3 at 752-67 (hereinafter NBRC Final
Report).
7. 149 B.R. 614 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
8. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982) [hereinafter Marathon].
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II.

CURRENT STRUCTURE AND UNDERLYING
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

Currently, 28 U.S.C. § 151 establishes bankruptcy courts as "a unit of
the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for that district."
This statute does not, however, confer jurisdiction.
Bankruptcy
jurisdiction is vested in the district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1334. The
district courts are in turn permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) to refer all
bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy courts. It is in this indirect way
that bankruptcy courts acquire their jurisdiction. Over matters within
their jurisdiction, bankruptcy courts have the power to adjudicate and to
order parties to act on the matters adjudicated. 9 Final orders, judgments
and decrees of the bankruptcy courts may not be appealed directly to the
circuit court of appeals but must first be appealed either to a district
court or, in certain circumstances, to a BAP. 10
Those circumstances are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 158. Two conditions
must be satisfied before an appeal which would otherwise go to the
district court may be taken to a BAP. First, the BAP must be created.
Section 158(b)(l) provides that "the judicial council of a circuit shall
establish" BAPs and appoint bankruptcy judges to them, unless the
council determines that there are not enough resources or that BAPs
would cause too· much delay. Second, the district judges must approve.
Section 158(b)(6) provides that appeals may not be heard by BAPs in
any given district unless a majority of judges in that district vote to
authorize such appeals. Once these two conditions are met, section 158(c) provides that appeals must go to a BAP unless any party to
an appeal, within 30 days of the notice of appeal, elects to have the
appeal heard by the district court. If this "opt out" election is made,
then the appeal will be heard by the district court. Finally, section 158(d) provides that appeals from either the BAPs or the district
courts made be heard 'by the circuit courts of appeals.

9. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (banlauptcy courts "may enter appropriate orders and
judgments"). See also 11 U.S.C. § 105 (bankruptcy courts may "issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title").
10. 11 U.S.C. § 158. A tangle of cases address the issue of what constitutes an
appealable final order, judgment or decree. Unraveling them, however, is beyond the
ambit of this paper.
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What role BAPs and their opinions should play in the bankruptcy
judicial structure cannot be fully explored without some understanding
of how they came to be and how they were restructured in response to
the Supreme Court's decision in Marathon. 11 This section will explain
(A) how the BAPs were first created, (B) how the constitutional
concerns articulated in Marathon affected the BAPs, and (C) how the
Congressional response to the Marathon decision critically changed the
BAP structure.
A.

Birth of the BAPs

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("BRA"), 12 was not the first
exercise of Congress' powers under Article I § 8 of the Constitution "to
establish ... uniform Laws of the subject of Bankruptcies through the
United States." However, the BRA accomplished so many reforms of
such significance that, rather than merely amend the statutory scheme
created by the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, Congress replaced it entirely with
a new statutory scheme known as the Bankruptcy Code. 13 Two of the
concerns which lay behind the enactment of the BRA are particularly
relevant to the creation of the BAPs. The House floor manager of the
BRA and its most tireless advocate, Representative Don Edwards (DCal.), described them this way:
[T]he years of study that lead to the passage of the 1978 bankruptcy law made
clear that the two major failings of the prior bankruptcy referee system were the
lack of simplicity in determining jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the
low status and lack of power of the bankruptcy judges which resulted in
disrespect for their position and inability to attract the best caliber judges. 14

I shall explain each concern in turn. First, one of the most serious
inadequacies of the old Bankruptcy Act was that it did not give either
the district courts or, through them, the referees, the authority they
needed to handle all the issues affecting the bankruptcy. The problem
was that the court's jurisdiction was in rem, that is, based on notions of
jurisdiction over property.
Thus, the district court's bankruptcy
jurisdiction extended only to controversies involving property in the
actual or constructive possession of the court-so called "summary
jurisdiction." The district court could exercise jurisdiction over other,
"plenary" matters, such as disputes involving property in the possession

11. See supra note 8.
12. P.L. 95-958, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
13. See generally, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787-6573; COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th
ed.) App. 2 (Legislative History).
14. 130 CONG. REC. H7490 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
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of third persons, only if all parties consented. Endless litigation of the
distinction between "summary" and "plenary" had generated much heat
but little light. As a result, significant amounts of judicial and litigant
resources were being spent on purely jurisdictional questions. 15
To cure this weakness, the Bankruptcy Reform Act attempted to
replace the idea of a bifurcated in rem jurisdiction with an unitary allencompassing jurisdiction. "Actions that formerly had to be tried in
State court or in Federal district court, at great cost and delay to the
estate, may now be tried in the bankruptcy courts .... The bankruptcy
court is given in personam jurisdiction as well as in rem jurisdiction to
handle everything that arises in a bankruptcy case." 16 There was little
controversy over this reform and the statute as enacted was very similar
to all of the proposed versions in both the House and Senate. To match
this extraordinary expansion of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, the BRA
explicitly granted bankruptcy courts all "the powers of a court of equity,
law and admiralty." 17
The second subject of concern, the status of the bankruptcy judges,
caused far more difficulty. Under the old 1898 Bankruptcy Act, district
courts were denominated as bankruptcy courts as well as courts of
general Federal jurisdiction, and had initial jurisdiction over bankruptcy
cases. They were permitted to refer these cases to bankruptcy "referees."
As appointees of the judges of the district court, like magistrates,
bankruptcy referees were subordinate judicial officers of the bankruptcy
c.ourt. Bankruptcy reformers objected to this structure because under it
"the bankruptcy court [] is not truly and completely a court. It is not
independent. It must operate under the supervision of an unconcerned
district court." 18 The reformers suggested that if bankruptcy referees
were given the power and prestige of true judges, then bankruptcy cases
would be better managed and the bankruptcy bench would attract better
qualified people. 19 Accordingly, many argued that bankruptcy judges
should be appointed as Article III judges which would protect their
independence by giving them life tenure with no possibility of reduction

15. See Report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
H.R. Doc. No. 95-137 at 89-92 (1973).
16. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 445 (1977)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter H.R. REP. 95-595].
17. 28 u.s.c. § 1481.
18. H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 16, at 4.
19. Id.
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in salary. Making the new bankruptcy courts Article III courts was
especially important, the reformers argued, because of the extensive
jurisdiction and broad powers being newly granted them. Others
responded, however, that the status of bankruptcy judges could be raised
sufficiently without having to go that far and that bankruptcy judges
should be given a limited tenure and be subject to the Federal Salary
Act.20
The House was the first to produce a bill. H.R. 8200, proposed on
February 1, 1978, would have created a new bankruptcy court, separate
and distinct from the district courts, pursuant to Congress' powers under
Article III. This action would have transformed the previously inferior
referees into Article III bankruptcy judges. 21
The Senate's bill, S. 2266, did not grant bankruptcy judges Article III
status. The Senate's approach to the problem of inferior status was to
make bankruptcy courts "of record," independent from (though still
"adjunct" to) district courts and to provide that bankruptcy judges be
appointed by the circuit judicial council for twelve-year terms, rather
than by the district judges for six-year terms as the Bankruptcy Act had
provided. The Senate sponsor of the bill, Senator DeConcini, asserted
that these measures, added to the broad grant of powers to the bankruptcy court over matters within its jurisdiction, would be enough to make
the bankruptcy judges "functionally independent of the Federal district
courts,"22 and would "[elevate them] to a status far above that of the
present referee." 23 When it received H.R. 8200, the Senate amended
it by substituting its bill for the House bill in full and approved H.R.
8200, as amended, on September 7, 1978.
In response to the Senate's proposal, the House retreated from the idea
of making bankruptcy courts Article III courts, but rather than accept the
Senate's bill, it proposed a compromise. Bankruptcy courts would be
established as adjuncts to the circuit courts. Bankruptcy judges would
have fixed 14-year tenures, and they would be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Original bankrupt-

20. 2 U.S.C. § 351-60. The Judicial Conference of the United States was among
those strenuously opposed to giving Article III status to bankruptcy judges. Kenneth N.
Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 947-48
(1979).
21. See H.R. REP. 95-595, supra note 16, at 15-31, 432-35. Another contributing
cause to the low status of bankruptcy referees addressed by the bill was the conflation
of judicial and administrative duties in the referees under the old 1898 Act. The bill
proposed to separate the two functions by creating the office of the U.S. Trustee to
administer bankruptcy cases, but leaving the judicial functions to bankruptcy judges.
22. 124 CONG. REC. Sl4,719 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978).
23. 124 CONG. REC. S17,404 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
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cy jurisdiction was to be vested in the circuit courts, but under the
proposed statute bankruptcy courts would be empowered to exercise all
of the judicial functions flowing from that grant of jurisdiction. 24
It was at this point in the legislative process that the BAPs first
appeared. In keeping with the idea that the bankruptcy courts should be
"adjuncts" to the circuit courts, the House bill provided that:
[i]f the circuit council of a circuit orders application of this section to a district
within such circuit, the chief judge of each circuit shall designate panels of
three bankruptcy judges to hear appeals from judgments, orders, and decrees of
the bankruptcy court of the United States for such district. Except as provided
in section 293(e) of this title, a panel shall be composed only of bankruptcy
judges for districts located in the circuit in which the appeal arises. The chief
judge shall designate a sufficient number of such panels so that appeals may be
heard and disposed of expeditiously.

The House's proposed compromise was passed (as yet another
wholesale amendment of H.R. 8200) and the bill was returned to the
Senate on October 1, 1978. However, "[a]t that point, the Chief Justice
of the United States personally intervened in an attempt to thwart
passage of the bankruptcy legislation."25 He opposed the compromise
idea of making bankruptcy courts adjuncts of the circuit courts. 26
Following his intervention the Senate rejected the proposed compromise
and reinstated its initial proposal of making the bankruptcy courts
adjuncts of the district courts. However, the Senate left the BAP
provision untouched and left the bankruptcy judges to be appointed by
the President, instead of the circuit. On October 6, 1978, the Senate
returned the bill to the House with a "take it or leave it" ultimatum.
Time was now a critical factor. The end of the ninety-fifth session of
Congress loomed and if the bill was not enacted by then, it would have
to start over in committee when the ninety-sixth Congress convened. In
the face of this pressure, the bill's managers in the House accepted the
Senate's ultimatum and the Senate's version was approved by the House
on October 6, 1978.27
Thus, as finally enacted the BRA created a new bankruptcy court
whose judges (1) were appointed by the President but removable by a
majority vote of the judicial council for the circuit, and (2) did not have

24.
25.
26.
27.

See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY§ 1.03 at 1-50 to -59.
Klee, supra note 20, at 954.
Id.
Id. The statutes created by the bill are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 151-58.
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life tenure and were not protected from reductions in salary. These
judges were then given the broadest possible jurisdiction over all matters
relating to bankruptcy cases through a "legislative sleight-of-hand."28
The BRA also created the BAPs,29 and endowed them with appellate
jurisdiction. 30 Individual bankruptcy courts at the trial level were
clearly intended to be adjuncts to the district courts. But BAPs could
legitimately be viewed as adjuncts to the circuit courts of appeals
because they had been created as part of the House proposal to make all
bankruptcy courts adjuncts of the circuit courts and their status had not
been altered in the legislative end-game. Indeed, that was the view
adopted by the only Circuit Court to consider the question. 31 Nothing
in the floor debates or committee reports sheds light on this peculiarity;
nothing in those sources explains either why the BAPs were included in
the penultimate House proposal or why they were retained in the final
Senate version. However, an explanation can be inferred from the 1973
report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
which Congress had formed in 1970 to study the bankruptcy system and
propose reforms. The Commission expressed a strong concern that, on
the one hand:
[t]he review of a referee's order by a single district judge, who is primarily a
trial court judge, is anomalous. In most state court systems, as well as
elsewhere in the federal judiciary, a judge's rulings can ordinarily be reviewed
only by a court consisting of three or more judges. 32

On the other hand, "[p]roposals to the Commission that review of
bankruptcy court rulings be routed to the courts of appeals without going
through the district courts were considered and rejected. The remoteness
of the courts of appeals for large numbers of potential appellants would
be a substantial deterrent to appeals." 33 The creation of BAPs resolved

28. Marathon Pipeline v. Northern Pipeline, 12 B.R. 946, 948, n.4 (D. Minn. 1981)
(Lord, J.), aff' d Marathon, supra note 8. The language conferring jurisdiction was found
in 28 U.S.C. § 1471. The description of the legislature's action appears in Marathon
Pipeline. The scheme worked this way: Section 147l(a) vested in the district courts
"original [i.e. trial] and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under title 11." Section
1471(b) vested in the district courts "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11."
Congress then turned around in§ 1471(c) and required that the bankruptcy courts "shall
exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred ... on the district courts." See l COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY § 3.01 (15th ed.) (emphasis added).
29. 28 u.s.c. § 160.
30. 28 u.s.c. § 1482.
31. Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1984).
32. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 96 (1973).
33. Id. at 97.
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these competing concerns by providing a three-judge appellate panel for
review of a single judge's actions in a more accessible forum to litigants
than the federal court of appeals.
B.

The Constitutional Concern and Marathon

On March 8, 1979, the Northern Pipeline Construction Company
(Northern) sued the Marathon Pipe Line Company (Marathon) in federal
district court in Kentucky, alleging breach of contract and invoking the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal court. In January 1980, while the
Kentucky case was pending, Northern filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition in Minnesota. In March 1980, in the context of the Minnesota
filing, Northern initiated an adversary proceeding against Marathon,
raising the same breach of contract claim it had sued on in Kentucky.
Because the breach of contract claim was governed by Kentucky law,
Marathon argued from the beginning that the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction. A federal court's adjudication of a state law claim would
be an exercise of the judicial power of the United States. That power
could be exercised only by tenured judges appointed under Article III of
the Constitution.
The constitutional concern raised by Marathon is typically termed the
"separation of powers" doctrine. In brief, those who wrote the
Constitution thought that governmental powers could be best divided
into three "inherently distinct" types: legislative, executive and judicial.34 What the Framers sought to avoid was "[t]he accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed,
or elective." 35 Such an accumulation would "justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny." 36 The Constitution, therefore, created three
departments or Branches, one for each of the three powers. "The
Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the
tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other." 37

34.
35.
36.
37.

Marathon, supra note 8, at 57.
Id. (quoting frorn THE FEDERALIST No. 47).
Id.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976).
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To make the Judicial Department an effective check upon the other
branches, the Framers required in Article III that judges be given (1) life
tenure (subject only to impeachment) and (2) irreducible salaries. Any
tribunal Congress created to exercise the functions assigned to the
Judicial Department which did not have those two characteristics would
be too vulnerable to pressure from the Legislative Department to be truly
independent and would thus constitute an accumulation of the judicial
power in the Legislature-the very definition of tyranny. 38
The BRA violated the Constitution, Marathon argued, because
Congress had created a tribunal (the bankruptcy court) with extensive
power to perform judicial functions, but had not given the judges of that
tribunal the two protections of Article III that would have made them
truly members of an independent branch of government. Instead,
Congress had used its powers under Article.I to create nothing more than
an extension of itself, the Legislative Department.
The Government offered two arguments for the statute's constitutionality. First, it claimed that Congress had the power to establish nonArticle III courts to hear bankruptcy matters because Article I gave
Congress the exclusive power to write bankruptcy laws. Second, and in
the alternative, it asserted that bankruptcy matters were in fact decided
by Article III courts because bankruptcy court decisions were reviewable
by the district courts and circuit courts.
The Supreme Court agreed with Marathon and rejected both of the
Government's arguments. It struck down 28 U.S.C. § 1471 as an
usurpation by the Legislative Department of those powers which could
only be exercised by the Judicial Department under Article III. 39 The
Court's decision was the product of a four-justice plurality (Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun) and a two-justice concurrence
(Rehnquist and O'Connor). In rejecting of the Government's first
argument, the plurality recognized that there were circumstances under
which Congress could create Article I courts, but decided that none of
those circumstances applied to adjudication of matters under the
bankruptcy laws. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 1741 was, on its face,
unconstitutional.
Writing for himself and Justice O'Connor, Justice Rehnquist also
rejected the Government's first argument but refused to go as far as the
plurality in his reasoning. He thought the issue was much narrower than
whether the entire scope of jurisdiction granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1471
violated Article III of the Constitution. The case involved only the

38.
39.
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attempted exercise by the bankruptcy court of its jurisdiction over a state
law claim that would otherwise be heard by an Article III federal district
court under its diversity jurisdiction. "To whatever extent different
powers granted [the bankruptcy courts] might be sustained . . . I am
satisfied that the adjudication of Northern's lawsuit cannot be so
sustained. " 40 Rehnquist refused to be drawn into the debate between
the plurality and the dissent over just how far Congress could go in
vesting non-Article III courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate cases and
controversies. However, he thought that the jurisdiction to adjudicate
state law claims was so mixed in with the rest of the jurisdiction granted
by 28 U.S.C. § 1741 as to be nonseverable, and that therefore the entire
provision must fall.
The second Government argument was also rejected by both the
plurality and the concurrence. The mere ability to appeal to an Article
III tribunal would not satisfy the constitutional scheme, the plurality
wrote, because:
[o]ur precedents make it clear that the constitutional requirements for the
exercise of the judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication, and not
only on appeal, where the court is restricted to considerations of law, as well
as the nature of the case as it has been shaped at the trial level. The Court
responded to a similar suggestion in Crowell by stating that to accept such a
regime, 'would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal
Constitution and to establish a government of bureaucratic character alien to our
system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do
depend, upon the facts, and finality as to the facts becomes in effect finality in
law.' 285 U.S. at 57. 41

Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor agreed that "the extent ofreview by
Art. III provided on appeal from a decision of the bankruptcy court in
a case such as Northern's does not save the grant of authority to the
latter under the rule espoused in Crowell v. Benson . ... " 42
Neither the Marathon plurality, concurrence nor dissent discussed the
BAPs, except to note their existence in passing. As the Ninth Circuit
later noted, "Marathon did not discuss what role a non-Article III officer
could play in the appellate process or, more specifically, whether the role

40. Id. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
41. Marathon, supra note 8, at 86 n.39 (quoting from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22 (1932)).
42. Marathon, supra note 8, at 91.
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of the BAP is consistent with Article III." 43 Specifically, although the
Court had clearly struck down 28 U.S.C. § 1471, which gave bankruptcy
courts trial jurisdiction, it was unclear whether the Court's holding or
logic extended to 28 U.S.C. § 1482, the statute granting jurisdiction to
the BAPs. The courts of the First and Ninth Circuits, the only two
circuits which had established BAPs under the BRA, agreed that the
Supreme Court had not considered the BAP statute, but came to opposite
conclusions on their own analysis as to whether that statute was
constitutional.
The First Circuit BAP was the first court to consider the continued
viability of the BAPs after Marathon. In Massachusetts v. Dartmouth
House Nursing Home, 44 the court noted that Marathon "did not declare
section 1482 unconstitutional," 45 but independently concluded that its
own existence was unconstitutional. This BAP noted that its jurisdiction
was to hear all appeals from the bankruptcy courts and the jurisdiction
of those courts was flawed. The court then reasoned: "It is obvious that
if Congress cannot constitutionally establish non-Article III courts to
exercise jurisdiction over the wide range of issues encompassed by
section 1471 at the trial level, then it cannot establish non-Article III
courts to hear the same issues at the appellate level." 46 The First
Circuit itself did not reach the constitutional question, finding instead
that the emergency rule governing bankruptcy procedure in the circuit
had effectively repealed authorization for the BAPs. 47
The unconstitutionality of the BAPs was, however, far from "obvious"
to the Ninth Circuit. It concluded that "the continued functioning of the
BAP is consistent with Article III and the Marathon decision." 48 The
Ninth Circuit thought the Dartmouth House reasoning had
omitted an important step. Marathon stated that non-Article III officers may
constitutionally perform judicial functions so long as an Article III judge retains
the essential attributes of the judicial power. The role of the BAP in the

43. Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1984).
44. In re Dartmouth House Nursing Home 30 B.R. 56. (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1983), aff'd
on other grounds 726 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1984).
45. Id. at 58.
46. Id. at 62.
41. In re Dartmouth House Nursing Home, 726 F.2d at 28-30. Marathon was
decided on June 28, 1982. However, out of concern for the massive disruption that it
would cause the bankruptcy system, the Supreme Court did not apply its decision
retroactively. Instead, the Court stayed its mandate-eventually until December 24,
1982-to give time for responsive measures to be taken before bankruptcy courts lost
their jurisdiction. By that time, each circuit had promulgated emergency rules to govern
bankruptcy procedure until such time as Congress enacted new legislation.
·
48. Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 1984).
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appellate process is constitutional because the court of appeals retains those
essential attributes. 49

The Ninth Circuit noted that the fatal flaw in the bankruptcy court
jurisdictional scheme appeared to be that too much power and jurisdiction had been granted to the bankruptcy "adjuncts," and too little
supervisory authority had been left in the district courts. That problem
did not exist with the BAPs because unlike the district court, in its
relationship to the trial level bankruptcy court, the court of appeals, in
its relationship with the BAP, retained all of the essential attributes of
the judicial power. First, the power to make the final determination of
all questions remained with the court of appeals, because it reviewed
BAP decisions de novo. This was far different from the highly
deferential standard of review of the district court over bankruptcy
courts' findings of fact, the aspect of the district court/bankruptcy court
relationship that so disturbed the Supreme Court. Second, the choice of
whether or not to establish or disband the BAP rested with the circuit
council. 50 Again, this evidenced a far greater degree of control over
the BAP by the circuit courts than the district courts exercised over the
individual bankruptcy court. Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded "that the
BAP is constitutional ... as an adjunct to the court of appeals." 51
The Ninth Circuit decided In re Burley on July 3, 1984. One week
later, on July 10, 1984, the question of the constitutionality of the BAPs
as created by the BRA was mooted by the passage of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA). This was
Congress' long-delayed response to Marathon.
C.

The Congressional Response to Marathon

In the BAFJA, Congress made several important changes to the
Bankruptcy Code. The most significant was jurisdictional. The BRA
had attempted to unify the bifurcated "summary" and "plenary"
bankruptcy jurisdictions into one all-encompassing jurisdictional grant,
which was then passed on automatically to the bankruptcy courts. In

49. Id. at 985.
50. The court might have added here that because the BAPs were created by the
circuit, and bankruptcy judges were removable by the circuit, the power to appoint and
remove had been taken from the Legislative Branch and lodged in the Judicial Branch.
51. In re Burley, 738 F.2d at 986.
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contrast, the BAFJA resurrected the concept of two classes of jurisdiction and left it to the district courts' discretion whether and what types
of matters to refer to the bankruptcy courts, which were now "units"
instead of "adjuncts." 52
The BAFJA did not return to the in rem distinction that the old 1898
Bankruptcy Act had made between property in and property out of the
court's possession; instead it introduced a distinction between "core" and
"non-core" proceedings. As the BRA had done, the BAFJA initially
lodged in the district courts all "original and exclusive jurisdiction over
bankruptcy cases" and "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under
title 11."53 However, the BAFJA differed from the BRA in that
bankruptcy courts could now "hear and determine" only those "proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11" that were
labeled "core proceedings."54 The bankruptcy court could exercise its
full range of powers over core proceedings, including the making of
final findings of fact, reviewable only for clear error. Proceedings that
were merely "related to a case under title 11" but not "arising under" or
"arising in" a case under title 11, were "non-core proceedings." 55 With
respect to those types of proceedings, a bankruptcy court had power to
"hear" but not to "determine." Final judgment came from the district
court, to whom the bankruptcy court had to submit proposed findings of
fact for de nova review (unless the parties consented to give the
bankruptcy court the power to make the final decision).
These provisions, along with the provisions allowing (and sometimes
requiring) the district court to withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy
court and allowing (and sometimes requiring) federal court abstention
from state law claims, were the chief correctives to the constitutional
concerns articulated in Marathon. It is evident that these correctives
addressed more the specific complaint of the concurrence than the broad
condemnation in the plurality opinion. 56 Whether these changes have
cured the constitutional defect in the BRA has never been tested in the
Supreme Court. Although lower courts have upheld the revised statute

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
28 u.s.c. § 1334.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
28 U.S.C. § 157(c).
See 130 CONG. REc. No. S8890 (1984) (remarks of Sen. Dole). Note that in
Marathon, the diversity of the parties gave the court federal subject matter jurisdiction.
An intriguing problem is whether Congress can, consistent with the limits on federal
jurisdiction in Article III, grant any federal forum subject matter jurisdiction over purely
state law issues merely because they are "related to" a bankruptcy case. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(c); 130 CONG. REC. Nos. S 8893-8894 (1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
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against constitutional challenges, 57 commentators are markedly split
over the matter. 58
,. , .
During the BAFJA legislative'process, the Ninth Circuit recommended
to the Senate that the BAPs be retained. 59 As finally enacted, the
BAFJA did preserve BAPs, but made two critical changes, both designed
to make the BAPs a subsidiary and voluntary alternative to the district
courts for those wishing to appeal. It appears that Congress was
operating on. the theory that parties could waive their right to have their
dispute heard by an Article III court. 60
The first change that the BAFJA made was in how BAPs were to be
established. Although BAP judges were still appointed by the judicial
council of the circuit (indeed, the BAFJA made the circuit courts
responsible for appointing bankruptcy judges in general, whereas the
BRA had lodged that power in the President), the circuit court could no
longer simply impose BAPs on the districts, as it was able to under the
BRA. Instead, under the new 28 U.S.C. § 158, a BAP could operate in
a given district only if a majority of the district judges in that district
voted for it.
The second change was that the BAFJA required that the litigants
consent before a BAP could hear an appeal. At first, the Ninth Circuit's
order establishing the post-1984 BAPs provided that appeals would go
to the district courts unless both parties agreed to have the appeal heard
by a BAP (an "opt in" rule). It was difficult, however, to obtain
affirmative consent from all parties to an appeal in a timely fashion. As
a result, only three appeals had been submitted to a BAP in the first six
months of the order's operation, while 352 appeals had gone directly to

57, See, e.g., In re Michigan Real Estate Ins, Trust, 87 B.R. 447 (E.D. Mich. 1988)
(vesting of jurisdiction in "units" of district court held constitutional); In re Global Int'l
Airways, 81 B.R. 541 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (vesting of jurisdiction in bankruptcy courts to
hear core matters held constitutional); Matter of Associated Grocers of Nebraska
Cooperative, 62 B.R. 439 (D. Neb. 1986) (Article III not violated by grant of power to
bankruptcy courts to avoid preferences under revised statutory scheme enacted by
Congress after Marathon).
58. See NBRC Final Report, supra note 6, at 732-37 .
59. Gordon Bermant & Judy B. Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth
Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 181, 191 n.56 (1989).
60. See Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy
Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 685 (1985) (explaining the absence of
legislative history and suggesting that Congress added the consent requirement out of "an
overabundance of caution").
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the district courts. 61 To deal with this problem, the Ninth Circuit
changed to an "opt out" rule: appeals were routed automatically to the
BAPs unless one party raised a timely objection. Since that change was
made, BAPs have heard about sixty percent of appeals taken from
bankruptcy courts . 62
The 1994 bankruptcy amendments have expanded the BAPs' role. As
enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 63 each circuit is now
required to form a BAP unless the circuit concludes that there are not
enough resources or that BAPs would cause too much delay. Nonetheless, it remains the rule that a BAP may operate only in a district that
has approved it. In the Second Circuit, for example, where BAPs have
been established, only three districts participate-and these together
typically receive less than a third of all bankruptcy petitions filed in the
Second Circuit. 64 The new amendments also codify the Ninth Circuit's
"opt out" rule: appeals go to the BAPs automatically in jurisdictions
where BAPs operate, unless a party timely objects. 65
Thus have BAPs come to dwell in a jurisprudential twilight zone: they
are mandated by law, and created by the circuit court of appeals, but
they exist only at the sufferance of each district court, hear appeals only
by consent of the parties, and are composed of judges who, when sitting
as trial judges, are mere "units" of the district court. The consequent
debate over what precedential value their opinions should be accorded
is not surprising. What is surprising is the degree to which almost all
the participants in that debate have assumed, without examination, that
the doctrine of stare decisis is (1) a clear and applicable doctrine that is
(2) desirable not only generally but specifically in bankruptcy law. The
next section will examine each of these assumptions and explore the
various justifications that support or undercut the doctrine generally.
Part III will then look to see which of these justifications support
application of the doctrine to BAP decisions.
Through this
commonsense analysis one can come to a principled conclusion about
the extent to which BAP decisions should bind other courts.

61. See Bermant & Sloan, supra note 59, at 192.
62. See, e.g., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Table S-14.
63. P.L. 103-394 (October 22, 1994).
64. The participating districts are Connecticut, Vermont and the Northern District
of New York. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Table F.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c).
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Ill.

THE IDEAS BEHIND STARE DECISIS
A.

Structure of the Doctrine

The term "stare decisis" is short for the maxim "stare decisis et no
quieta movere" which may be translated "let stand what is decided and
do not disturb what is settled." 66 The key idea behind this judicially
created, flexible doctrine is that a judge should follow the legal rules
used to decide a prior case that was like the pending case, even when the
judge believes the prior decision erroneous. 67 Before delving into the
justifications for this idea, a brief description of the doctrine's structure
may be helpful.

1.

Strict and Lenient Stare Decisis

The doctrine of stare decisis is· nothing if not flexible. It can bind
with ball and chain or with rubber bands. How strictly the doctrine is
applied varies across both space and time. While the key concept
behind stare decisis is found in almost all legal systems, the doctrine
itself is given uniform force neither between judicial systems nor even
within a single judicial system over time. For example, beginning in the
seventeenth century the British House of Lords, the court of last resort
in Great Britain considered itself strictly bound by its own previous
decisions. 68 Then in 1966 that body decided it could, after all, modify
or even overrule itself. 69 At the other extreme, most civil law countries
would deny that they apply stare decisis at all. That is, they claim not
to be bound by any prior single decision. 70 But they do follow the

66. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
67. This was nicely put in Paul W. Werner, Comment The Straits of Stare Decisis
and the Utah Court of Appeals: Navigating the Scylla of Under-Application and the
Charybdis of Over-Application, 1994 B.Y.U.L. REV. 633, 640 (1994). "When a court
lays down a rule of law attaching a specific legal consequence to a detailed set of facts,
the court must adhere to the legal principle it has announced by applying it in all
subsequent cases that come before it presenting a similar factual premise."
68. Bussel, supra note 5, at 1081 n.75.
69. Id. Even now, the second highest court in Great Britain, the Queens Bench,
which sits in panels much like American courts of appeal, adheres strictly to its prior
decisions, even to the point that a panel decision will bind the court sitting en bane.
70. "A central premise in civil law systems is that judicial decisions are not a
source of law. It would violate the rules against judicial lawmaking if decisions of
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same idea; they simply call it something like "looking for the trend in
the law." As a matter of practice the courts in such countries do
consider, respect, and give weight to other decisions. 71 Though never
as strict as British courts, nor as loose as the Continental ones, our own
Supreme Court has vacillated over time in its adherence to the doctrine.
In the past twenty years the Court appears to have [at least] discussed
the doctrine more than at any other time in its history.72
2.

Horizontal and Vertical Stare Decisis

Stare decisis is usually described in hierarchical terms: it is the
application by a "lower" court of the decisions of a "higher" court,
where "higher" is defined as the possession of any power to review a
"lower" court's decision. The obvious example is the application of
Supreme Court decision by the lower federal courts. 73 This is known
as "vertical stare decisis." However, the doctrine also has application
between coordinate panels of a single court, or between the same court's
previous decisions and the current case. For example, the United States
Courts of Appeals typically sit in panels of three judges. A panel
decision is binding on all subsequent panel decisions within the same
circuit. Likewise, the Supreme Court's prior decisions have a stare
decisis effect on its later cases. This application of the doctrine is
termed "horizontal stare decisis." 74
While some judges understand both meanings of stare decisis, 75
others confuse the general doctrine with its specific application to
"superior" and "inferior" courts. 76 Courts and commentators concerned
with BAPs have typically devoted their analytical energies solely to the
question whether or not a prior decision has come from a "superior"
court. They have assumed that if a court is "superior" then obedience

a

courts were to be binding on subsequent courts. Hence, no court is bound by tbe
decision of any other court in a civil law jurisdiction." Evan Caminker, Why Must
Inferior Court Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STANFORD L. REV. 817, 826
(1994).
71. Brookner, supra note 5, at 313 n.2; Bussel, supra note 5, at 1081 n.76.
72. A LEXIS search for all Supreme Court cases in which the term "stare decisis"
appears found 335 of them: In the past 20 years, tbere have been about 10-14 per term.
In the 10 years prior to that, the numbers drop off sharply, to 2-4 per term, and tben, in
the period back to 1800, the term is mentioned only every few years.
73. Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Among and Within Florida's District Courts of
Appeal, 18 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 143, 143-44 (1990).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 173 B.R. 672, 676
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (Mund, J.).
76. For an excellent exploration of tbe range of justifications for vertical stare
decisis, see Caminker, supra note 70.

1662

BAP Decisions

[VOL. 34: 1643, 1997]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

is owed and that if a court is not "superior" then its decisions must not
be binding. 77 Such a slavish devotion to :hierarchy without a fair
examination of the underlying reasons why hierarchy matters obscures
rather than illuminates. As Professor Evan Caminker aptly warns: "[W]e
must take care not to confuse the familiar with the necessary: The
common law system's axiom that lower courts must obey superior court
precedent needs justification."78 The next two sections will briefly
review the rationales which support stare decisis, both as a general
proposition and as principle for the operation of a hierarchical system,
as well as those rationales which undermine it.
B.

Reasons for Stare Decisis

There are a number of ways in which the justifications for stare decisis
might be presented. No single justification explains the application of
the doctrine in all circumstances or for all courts. 79 I present the
justifications in roughly the order of the frequency with which I have
seen them articulated in cases and commentaries, with just a brief
description of each.
1.

Stability

One common justification for stare decisis is that it promotes stability
in the law. Justice Brandeis' epigram is one often-quoted expression of
this idea: "stare decisis . is usually the wise policy, because in most

77. See, e.g., Catalona v. Holdenried (In re Holdenried), 178 B.R. 782, 786 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1995) (bankruptcy court bound by prior district court decision because "[t]his
Court must follow the decisions of a higher court having direct appellate review"); In
re Shattuc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (stare decisis described
only as "lower courts are bound to follow the decisions of superior courts" and therefore
bankruptcy court not bound by prior district court decision because district court was not
superior to bankruptcy court which was a "unit" of the district court); March & Obregon,
supra note 5 (BAP and district court decisions should not bind any court because neither
BAPs nor district courts are functionally superior). But see Bussel, supra note 5
(exploring range of justifications for making both BAP and district court decisions
binding on bankruptcy courts).
78. Caminker, supra note 70, at 826.
19. Id. at 817; Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis,
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 73-78 (1989).
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matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right. " 80
At the same time, it is recognized that stability is only a means to an
end, not an end in itself. Stability is desirable to the extent that it can
"furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to
plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise." 81 Thus,
stare decisis tends to be of greater importance in areas of law in which
people might rely upon a given legal rule to govern their conduct. For
example, it is a widely accepted assumption in tort law that the level of
care people take in performing a given activity will vary with the
governing liability rules, so that if the rules change, so will their
behavior. 82
Likewise, it is widely believed that parties rely upon
known legal rules in entering into contractual relationships. 83 The
reliance aspect of the stability rationale can, however, easily be
overstated. "The picture of the bewildered litigant lured into a course
of action by the false light of a decision, only to meet ruin when the
light is extinguished and the decision overruled, is for the most part a
figment of .excited brains." 84 Certainly, the value of stability as a
justification for stare decisis is less important in areas of law where the
legal rule does not necessarily influence people's behavior, or where the
legal rule may not be the only or even the primary influence on
behavior. 85
Nor is the value of stability uniform across time; stability loses its
attractiveness as it becomes stagnation. If law is to be an enforcer of

80. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See also Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (stare decisis ensures
that "the law will not merely change erratically"). See also Jonathan R. Macey, The
Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L: REV. 93,
102-07 (1989) (attributing societal economic benefits of decreased error costs and
decreased transaction costs to increased stability provided by stare decisis).
81. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
82. This idea is discussed in the context of automobile/pedestrian accidents in
Chapter 6 of A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 3751 (1983), and is also discussed in Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on
Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 68-69, 82-86 (1989).
83. E.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Considerations in favor
of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where
reliance interests are involved"). Contract law and tort law are not the only area where
stare decisis is thought to be of special importance. See Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio
Ry., 57 U.S. 314, 325 (1850) ("There are no cases, where an adherence to the maxim
of 'stare decisis' is so absolutely necessary to the peace of society, as those which affect
retroactively the jurisdiction of the courts").
84. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 122 (1924).
85. E.g., Moragne, supra note 81, at 403-04 (allowing cause of action for
negligence would not violate stability rationale behind stare decisis because it would
simply "effectuate well-established rules of primary behavior").
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social values, it must also be a reflection of them. Thus, the concept of
stability must include a notion of orderly change over time; too rigid an
adherence to stare decisis may actually undermine social stability. 86
Imagine the consequences if the Court in Brown v. Bd. of Education had
adhered to the doctrine of separate but equal laid down in Plessey v.
Ferguson.
The stability rationale is invoked most often to justify vertical stare
decisis. However, both theory and practice suggest it is also relevant to
the justification of horizontal stare decisis between multi-judge panels.
The theoretical relevance arises from the difficulties encountered by
groups of people who, by voting or by some other means, must translate
the preferences expressed by their individual members into a preference
expressed by the whole group. Social scientists who study. collective
decision-making-the study of social choice-assert that it is impossible
to devise a rational method for translating individual preferences into
group preferences. 87 One phenomenon of collective decision-making,
which social choice scholars have studied for well over 200 years, is that
there may never be any result which can withstand shifting coalitions of
voting blocks, even assuming (with a great leap of faith) that everyone
involved in the decision process acts in a completely principled way. 88
Unprincipled behavior simply exacerbates the difficulty of maintaining
majority agreement for a given outcome. 89 This problem, called
cycling by social choice theorists, is as inevitable in a three-judge panel
as it is in a hundred-member senate. 90 A rule of stare decisis is at least
a partial solution to the problem of cycling, because application of the

86. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.KENT L. REV. 63, 82-90 (1989) (exploring the justification for stare decisis where
changes in society's substantive values change the socially optimal legal outcomes).
87. See generally Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social
Choice, 103 YALE L. REV. 1219 (1994) (reviewing social choice literature); KENNETH
J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d Ed. 1963).
88. Steams, supra note 87.
89. Id.
90. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1329-50 (1995) (demonstrating how cycling phenomenon
occurs within multi-judge panels); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court,
95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982) (demonstrating how it is impossible for the Supreme Court
to be consistent over time).
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rule slows the rate at which decisions can change over time and thus
promotes stability. 91
The practical relevance of the stability rationale to horizontal stare
decisis is demonstrated by the experience of the Michigan intermediate
court of appeals, which found that where multi-judge panels fail to apply
horizontal stare decisis, the law becomes less stable. 92
2.

Uniformity

Closely related to stability is the idea that stare decisis promotes
uniformity in the law. The debate over this justification often depends
on which aphorism one prefers: "treat like cases alike" or "two wrongs
don't make a right." To those concerned that each case be justified on
its merits rather than by reference to an established rule, this justification
for stare decisis is unpersuasive. Even for those who prefer uniform
rules, however, there are problems with this justification. The idea of
the first aphorism is that like cases should yield like results; equality
before the law means equal treatment by the law. This principle sounds
well as it trips off the tongue, but its practical application is like nailing
Jell-O to the wall. What constitutes the relevant facts that make one
case like another is frequently open to debate. 93 Treating people fairly
sometimes requires applying different rules, or recognizing that a given
rule cannot be uniformly applied without injustice. For example, assume
that a local ordinance prohibits people from sleeping in tents within the
city limits. The application of that rule to upper -middle-class teenagers
frolicking in the park is something quite different from the "uniform"
application of the rule to a homeless family camped under the freeway.94
Likewise, uniformity, like stability, can degenerate into
stagnation. While few doubt that the law strives to be "fair" it is not

91. Stearns, supra note 90, at 1329-50.
92. See Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Within Michigan's Court of Appeals:
Precedential Effect of Its Decisions on the Court Itself and on Michigan Trial Courts,
37 WAYNE L. REV. 265, 285 (1991) (listing areas of confusion and conflict).
93. One such debate occurs in the area of poverty law where scholars argue over
what facts should be presented to an adjudicator and how they should be presented. For
an especially lucid review and critique of the debate, see Kathy Lesser Mansfield,
Deconstructing Reconstructive Poverty Law: A Practice-Based Critique of the
Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of Practice Movement, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 889
(1995) .
94. Deciding what predicate facts are relevant to the invocation of stare decisis can
also be seen as another facet of the hoary debate over rules versus standards. See, e.g.,
Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 104 (1981) (advocating that judges follow the "meta-rule"
established in prior cases rather than "some narrowly defined construction of the precise
legal rule").
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always clear that uniform application of a given legal rule is the way to
achieve faimess. 95

3.

Judicial Economy and Efficiency

Courts frequently intone the mantra that "[t]his court must follow the
decisions of a higher court having direct appellate review," 96 and that
"lower courts are bound to follow the decisions of superior courts."97
It could be that these are normative statements about the value of
hierarchy-assertions that the judges of a "superior" court must be
obeyed because of where they sit in the hierarchy. The strong version
of this normative claim might be that the judges of "superior" courts
must be obeyed because they are appointed by virtue of being better
judges than those appointed to the "inferior" court. A simple look at
who is on the bench suffices to refute this claim; few would assert that
Judges Richard Posner or John Minor Wisdom are in any sense inferior
to, say, Justice Clarence Thomas. The weaker version of the normative
claim would suggest that there is some tendency for more competent
jurists to be appointed to the more prestigious positions. However, the
question then becomes what value is served by pretending that all
superior court judges are inherently smarter and wiser than inferior court
judges. That is an even more difficult normative claim to advance than
the strong version, for it advocates institutionalizing hypocrisy. If only
some are better, why defer to all? And if not deferring to all, then upon
what basis does someone (who?) decide exactly which are the better
judges?
It is not necessary, however, to defend the mantra as a normative
claim. It may instead be supported by two consequentialist claims: that

95. The debate over the proper role of the state in accommodating religious beliefs
and actions stemming from those beliefs is another excellent example of claims that a
rule, supposedly "neutral" because applied to all persons, is actually discriminatory
because people attempting to exercise their religious beliefs "are different in a way that
cannot be changed but can only be accommodated." Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1109, 1140 (1990)
(analogizing theory of accommodation for free exercise of religion to handicap
discrimination where "the paradigmatic instance . . . is treating people who are
fundamentally different as if they were the same").
96. Catalona v. Holdenried (In re Holdenried), 178 B.R. 782, 786 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1995).
97. In re Shattnc Cable Corp., 138 B.R. 557, 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
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the "path-of-review" justifies stare decisis, and that appellate courts are
just better at getting the law right than are trial courts. I consider each
of these claims in turn.
The first claim is that by establishing a path of review, the principle
of stare decisis promotes judicial economy and leads to more efficient
decision-making. The lower court's adherence to a rule laid down by
the appellate court saves the litigants the time and expense of appealing
against a foregone conclusion. The lower court's obedience also
conserves judicial resources: the resources of the appellate judiciary, 98
and its own. The ability to rely upon precedent frees the trial court from
re-inventing the wheel or becoming expert in all areas of the law that
come before it.
The path-of-review rationale justifies vertical stare decisis more than
horizontal stare decisis. It also almost proves too much. That is, it
assumes, as the footnoted quote from Moore's demonstrates, that chaos
would ensue without vertical stare decisis. But the very reasons for the
rule in the first place would appear to operate to restrain trial judges as
much as the rule itself-few people wish to reinvent the wheel or to
learn every area of law in order to make an informed decision. Often,
regardless of whether there is a formal rule or not, prior decisions of
reviewing courts will be followed because that is the easiest action to
take. Moreover, there is another, very practical, reason for lower court
judges to obey higher court decisions. "Judges follow the decisions of
higher courts because they know that the higher courts will reverse if
they don't and the value of the trial court's decisions (and hence his or
her effectiveness as a judge) will be diminished if he or she is always
reversed. "99
The second consequentialist claim for strong vertical stare decisis is
that the appellate courts are inherently better decision-makers and are
more likely than a trial court to find or establish the correct legal rule.
This has little to do with the individual abilities of the appellate judge
and everything to do with the structure of the appellate court. This idea
is something more than "three heads are better than one." Since
appellate panels are solely in the business of hearing appeals, they are
institutionally more competent to decide them. The legal issues will
have been defined below. The parties will brief the issues more

98. 1B Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed. 1990) 'I[ 0.402[1] at 10 n.14 ("unless the
inferior courts· make a good faith effort to follow the decisions of the courts with
jurisdiction to review their judgments, appeals would be endless"). For an exposition
of the economic justifications for stare decisis, see Macey, supra note 80; Kornhauser,
supra note 86.
99. In re Muskin, 151 B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993) (Jaroslovsky, J.).
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carefully than at trial, where the demands of fact-finding may absorb
their resources. The appellate panel will likewise not be distracted by
the trial from concentrating on the law and will have more time and
resources to consider the law than does the trial judge. Finally,
communication between the judges will lead to a better result since each
judge can test the soundness of his or her reasoning against the
others. 100
Of course, once an issue has received the benefit of a variety of
judicial opinions, this justification weakens. That is, a trial court may
be able to overcome some of the disadvantages of lack of time, lack of
proper briefing, and lack of colleagues if there are a variety of easily
discovered decisions on point. And, indeed, one often sees in trial court
opinions careful research and thoughtful analysis of points of law on
which there is a great deal of controversy. 101

4.

Judicial Legitimacy

A fourth justification for stare decisis is that it promotes two
fundamental principles of American democracy and so protects the
legitimacy of the judiciary. One such fundamental principle is that no

100. Indeed, purely as a function of probability, a group of judges is more likely to
reach the "right" result in a given case than is an individual judge, assuming that each
judge on the panel is more likely than not to individually find the correct rule. I
emphasize that this only works when each panel judge is also more than 50% likely to
reach the right result sitting solo. So, where x = probability of a "right" result (x >
50%), and y = probability of a "wrong" result (y = 100% - x), then for a three-judge
panel the probability of a "right" result is given by the formula
+ 3x2y; for a court
with nine members, deciding by majority vote, the formula would be x 9 + 9x8y + 36x7y2
+ 84x6y3+ 126x5y4. Thus, if each judge on a three-judge panel has an 80% probability
of reaching the "right" result sitting alone, then voting together they have an 89.6%
probability of reaching the correct disposition. This calculation also assumes each judge
remains independent of the others. A strong-willed judge would affect the outcome
either way depending on that judge's brilliance or stupidity.
101. Further, as Evan Caminker points out, this justification may also weaken in
situations calling for the exercise of equitable discretion. Caminker, supra note 70, at
849 n.128. He argues that just as the trial court is best suited to judicial fact-finding,
so it is institutionally best suited to make equitable decisions and to create equitable
exceptions. His suggestion is, however, only one side of the debate over the adage "hard
cases make bad law." It may be that trial courts are too close to a case to appreciate
how an equitable ruling in the case before them could lead to inequitable decisions over
time. But it also may be that more remote courts simply lack the discipline, imagination
or flexibility to prevent equitable exceptions from becoming lawless exercises of
arbitrary will.

x3
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person, and hence no judge, is above the law. To view judicial
decisions as products of uncontrolled willfulness on the part of a judge
would rob those decisions of whatever moral power they have to
command obedience. Courts have little power to coerce obedience
directly and so must rely upon the acceptance of their decisions as
reasoned products of disinterested minds. A dramatic example was the
State of Georgia's defiance of Worcester v. Georgia, 102 where the
Supreme Court held that under treaties made by the United States with
the Native American tribes, certain lands in Georgia desired by white
settlers belonged to the Cherokees. The decision did nothing to help the
Cherokees; they were forcibly removed anyway. President Andrew
Jackson refused to help, reputedly sneering "John Marshall has made his
decision, now let him enforce it." 103 The quote is apocryphal, although
Jackson was in complete sympathy with the Georgians. But Jackson
also recognized that federal power was too weak to support the Supreme
Court's mandate. Without that support, the mandate was worthless:
"The decision of the supreme court has fell [stillborn], and they find that it
cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate, and I believe Ridge 104 has
expressed despair, and that it is better for them to treat and move. In this he
is right, for if orders were issued tomorrow one regiment of militia could not
be got to march to save them from destruction and this the opposition know,
and if a collision was to take place between them and the Georgians, the arm
of the ;overnment is not sufficiently strong to preserve them from destruction. "10

102. 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (1832).
103. GLYNDON G. VANDEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA 1828-1848, 49 (1959).
104. Major John Ridge was a leader of the Cherokee party that held out against the
Georgians. He did indeed "treat" on December 29, 1835, and moved his party west. IV
CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON, John Spencer Bassett (ed.) 430 n.2 (editor's
note) (1929).
105. Id. at 430. In the 1820s, encouraged by a series of treaties with the United
States, the Cherokees had established themselves as a farming community in Georgia.
The treaties guaranteed their sovereignty. When gold was discovered on their land,
however, the Georgia legislature and Governor Lumpkin quickly enacted statutes which
renounced the treaties, appropriated the lands, and extended state jurisdiction over all
Indian lands. One Com Tassels, a Cherokee, committed murder on Indian land. He was
arrested, tried, and convicted under Georgia law and sentenced to hang. He and the
Cherokee tribe appealed to the Supreme Court to declare his sentence void because
under the treaties he should have been tried and punished under tribal law. The Supreme
Court issued a writ for Governor Lumpkin to show cause why Com Tassel should not
be released. Lumpkin ignored the writ and had Tassel hanged, which mooted that
appeal. See Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Peters) 1 (1831). One year
later, a Congregationalist minister, Samuel Worcester, was sentenced to four years at
hard labor for failing to obtain a state permit to live on Indian lands. Again, he and the
Cherokee tribe appealed to the Supreme Court to reverse. This time, the Court was able
to hear the case and issued an opinion (written by Marshall) and an order nullifying the
sentence and declaring the above-described statutes unconstitutional. Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (1832). Again, the Supreme Court's order was ignored,
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In general, however, litigants obey court decisions. In large part they
do so because• such decisions are seen as the product of reasoned
application of legal rules and not mere politics or personality. Thus,
"stare decisis" is important not merely because individuals rely on
precedent to structure their commercial activity but because fidelity to
precedent is part and parcel of a conception of "the judiciary as a source
of impersonal and reasoned judgments." 106 Maintaining the perception
that judges reach decisions on the basis of legitimate legal principles,
that judges are not above the law is, I suggest, a key reason favoring
stare decisis.
Another fundamental tenet of American democracy which stare decisis
supports is the concept of majority rule. The democratic ideal is that the
legislature makes the laws, the executive carries them out, and the
judiciary enforces them (unless it finds them unconstitutional).
However, the reality is that the legislature cannot foresee all contingencies and may deliberately avoid providing even for those it can foresee
because it is unable to make hard political choices. Consequently,
statutes are frequently ambiguous. Sometimes the ambiguities are
resolved by the formulation of administrative rules, but at least as often
they are resolved by judicial decisions. "[T]he courts, the most
electorally non-accountable body of government, routinely choose
between a variety of possible constructions of a legislative act, any one
of which the legislature could have legitimately chosen." 107 By
following a strict rule of stare decisis with respect to statutory interpretation, the courts can send a clear signal to Congress that it cannot
completely abdicate its legislative function:

Worcester was not released, and the Cherokees were driven out of their lands. See
Rebecca BROOKS GRUVER, AN AMERICAN HISTORY 370-72 (1972); VAN DEUSEN, supra
note 103; ADRIENNE SIEGEL, THE MARSHALL COURT 1801-1835 at 175-87 (1987).
106. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 852 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, supra note 81). See also, Thornburgh v. Am. College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)
(without stare decisis, "deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with
arbitrary and unpredictable results"); Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. at 265 (1986) (stare
decisis "permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather
than in the proclivities of individuals'').
107. Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for An Absolute Rule
of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 206 (1989) (advocating strict
application of stare decisis to decisions construing federal statutes).
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We have said also that the burden borne by the party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked to overrule
a point of statutory construction. Considerations of stare decisis have _special
force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress
remains free to alter what we have done. 108

Thus, by unwavering interpretation of a statute, a court can advance
an important democratic value. By declining, in effect, to usurp the
majoritarian norm, it can put the onus on the electorate to direct the
legislature to correct any "erroneous" interpretation. For example, a
debate in Congress between two legal rules may lead to statutory
language which is worded so ambiguously that it could be interpreted to
support either rule. Congress will be unlikely to succeed in overriding
whichever rule the judiciary "interprets" the statute to express (because
otherwise Congress could have chosen the other rule in the first place).
The electorate, however, assuming it had the requisite knowledge and
concern about the issue, could instruct or elect representatives to
"correct" the law if the electorate knew that stare decisis would prevent
the judiciary from altering its interpretation. Contrariwise, the absence
of legislative correction does not serve the same majoritarian norms;
collective silence should not be construed as collective consent to a
particular interpretation. 109
In sum, a rule of stare decisis is not itself a democratic rule. It does
nothing to change the autocratic nature of a judicial decision. But it
does promote the majoritarian value of democracy indirectly by enabling
the judiciary to resist the temptation repeatedly to "legislate" on the
same subject by interpreting and re-interpreting a particular statute.
The force of this rationale for stare decisis varies with the circumstances, as do other rationales. For example, in jurisdictions where the
judiciary is elected, the rationale may lose considerable force to the
argument that the judiciary is as answerable to the electorate as the
legislature, and the judge who advances an unpopular interpretation of
a statute risks losing the next election. 110 Likewise, the less one
believes that law and politics can or should be separated, the less
sensible this rationale becomes. The idea that stare decisis prevents the

108. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
109. See Marshall, supra note 107, at 193-96 (arguing that democratic legislative
process is undermined by judicial reliance on Congressional silence or inaction); see also
William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988).
110. However, the idea of a judiciary responsive to the electorate, while popular a
century ago, has fallen out of favor in the past 50 years. See David W. Case, In Search
of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to Judicial Elections in Mississippi, 13 MISS.
C. L. REV. 1, 10 (1992).
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usurpation of political powers which properly belong in the legislature
becomes problematic: since the political predilections of judges already
pervade their decisions, to follow a prior interpretation of a statute is
merely to give force to the political will of another judge at an earlier
time. It is, in effect, to vote the party line-and it does not withdraw
the judiciary from the realm of the political.
5.

A Constitution or Statute Requires

Finally, stare decisis may be required by either a constitution or
statute. For example, when the United States Constitution speaks in
terms of a "supreme" court and "inferior" courts, it arguably requires
that all federal courts obey Supreme Court precedent. Article I
empowers Congress to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court" and Article III provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Some
scholars read these clauses as establishing "inferior" courts which are
subservient to the "supreme" court. 111 Others, however, read the term
"inferior" as referring to a lesser degree of jurisdictional authority than
the term "supreme." 112
Even if the Constitution were read as requiring "inferior" federal
courts to follow Supreme Court precedent, however, the justification
would extend only from the lower federal courts to the Supreme Court
and would not speak either to the relationship between lower federal
111. Caminker, supra note 70, at 828-38.
112. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Ill: Separating The Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 254-59 (1985) (arguing that the
Supreme Court is "supreme" because, among other reasons, it is the court of last resort,
the only court from which no appeal lies); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155,
1180 n.139 (1992) (suggesting that the terms "inferior" and "supreme" could refer to the
differing geographical jurisdictions assigned to each tier of courts). My own historical
study of why the "Supreme" Court of New York is not and has never been the court of
last resort leads me to conclude that the terms "supreme" and "inferior," without more,
are as likely to refer to a concept of geographical jurisdiction as a concept of obedience.
See Bryan T. Camp, Politics and Power in the Court for the Correction of Errors,
(1988) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Virginia) (on file with author) (discussing
how the Supreme Court of New York was "supreme" not in the sense that it had the
final word on what rule of law would prevail, because it most assuredly did not, but
because its word, until such time as it was reversed by the Court for the Correction of
Errors, was binding on all lower courts throughout the state).
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courts themselves (i.e. between trial and appellate courts) or to the
relationship between state courts and the Supreme Court.
Likewise, while the Constitution could be said to require state courts
to follow federal decisions on federal law under the Supremacy Clause,
it is also arguable that the Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34 (the Federal Rules
of Decision Act) requires federal courts to apply stare decisis to issues
of state law decided by state courts. The Rules of Decision Act provides
that "[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law
in the court of the United States in cases where they apply." 113
It was certainly argued in early Supreme Court cases that the Supreme
Court (and other federal courts) must abide by state court precedent on
state law issues. 114 As is well known, this argument was squashed on
two grounds in Swift v. Tyson. 115 First, state court decisions were not
"laws" within the meaning of the Judiciary Act because court decisions
did not "make" laws but were only evidence of what the law was.
Second, if state and local court decisions on matters of "general law"
were binding, that would lead to chaos in the federal system. 116 Swift
was itself overruled by Erie v. Tompkins, 117 with the interesting
comment: "[l]f only a question of statutory construction were involved
we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course
pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do so." 118
Thus, it is not too much to say that the Rules of Decisions Act, as
interpreted since 1938, commands the federal courts to obey the state
courts of last resort as to issues of state law. In effect, it establishes a
limited stare decisis rule for federal courts.
C.

Reasons Against Stare Decisis

Although the above justifications support a rule of stare decisis under
some circumstances, it does not follow that a rule of stare decisis is
<lesirable in all situations. As described above; each justification applies
113. Federal Rules of Decision Act (originally codified at 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1940))
(codified as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1997))
114. See, e.g., Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (counsel arguing
that New Jersey Supreme Court precedent interpreting land grant patent should have
preclusive effect under doctrine of stare decisis).
115. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, overruled by Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
116. Martin, 41 U.S. 367, at 1.
117. Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
118. Id. at 77-78. For a discussion of the relationship of stare decisis to statutory
construction, see supra text accompanying note 107.
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more strongly in some circumstances than in others. In addition, there
are several reasons why stare decisis may sometimes run counter to other
worthy legal doctrines and policies.

1.

The Law Will Be Better Developed

One problem with a strict rule of stare decisis is that it requires
obedience to the "first out" decision. There is no a priori reason to
believe that the first decision to come out of an appellate court is any
better than the second or third decision. In fact, if anything, the intuition
is that the later decisions will be more valuable and so should be
accorded more respect. 119
The United States generally does not follow a "first out" rule. Instead,
there are two important ways in which the legal systems operating within
the United States eschew stare decisis in favor of legal diversity and
non-uniformity, a situation that some (especially civil law students
learning common law) find distressingly confusing.
First, the United States is unique among the world's legal systems in
the degree to which it is a federal system. It contains over fifty nonfederal jurisdictions applying their own local laws, which must be
respected by the national courts. One cannot expect the laws of over
fifty jurisdictions to be uniform, and they are not. Far from considering
it a liability, however, our jurisprudence celebrates this diversity of laws
and legal regimes.
Second, the federal courts are structured so that a "first out" decision
does not necessarily control subsequent decisions. That is, the Supreme
Court has great discretion in deciding what cases it will take under
consideration. Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules makes it clear that
a petition for a writ of certiorari "will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons. therefore." In describing those reasons,
the Court Rule speaks in terms of conflict. It favors for consideration
issues over which there are conflicts between and among the courts of
appeals or state courts of last resort, and cases in which any court's
decision of a federal question "conflicts with applicable decisions of this
119. See Julia R. Hathaway, Note, Conflict Resolution Among Panels of the
Michigan Court of Appeals Under Administrative Order 1994-4, 41 WAYNE L. REV.
1409 (1995) (arguing against "first out" rule promulgated by Michigan Supreme Court
requiring intermediate courts of appeals to obey the first panel decision on a subject until
the rule thereby established is overturned by the Supreme Court).
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Court." The idea behind this principle is that conflict is good. The
Court recognizes that the "first out" opinion on any given issue by a
circuit does not preclude another circuit from deciding differently.
Conflicting circuit opinions allow legal issues to "percolate," and it may
be that a legal problem. will work itself out through this process. Far
from being harmful, a short-term diversity of legal rules may actually
help the long-term resolution of a legal problem. In this way, a legal
regime freed from strict stare decisis may actually develop better law if
orderly change is provided for by other mechanisms.
2.

Judicial Economy and Legitimacy

To be effective, stare decisis requires that the judge applying the
doctrine be able to distinguish between dicta and holdings. This is often
quite hard to do. 120 Adherence to stare decisis thus consumes judicial
resources as courts try to parse past decisions to discover what is binding
and what is not. Worse, it consumes judicial resources as judges twist
precedent to justify the desired results. 121 Either way, stare decisis
wastes time and effort, and undermines judicial legitimacy if the doctrine
is observed only in the breach.

IV.

A.

THE

CONFLICT BETWEEN STARE DECISIS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

Bankruptcy and District Courts Should Be
Bound by BAP Decisions

Considering only the ideas behind stare decisis, and putting aside for
the moment the constitutional concerns involved, I submit that both
bankruptcy and district courts should be bound by BAP decisions to the
same extent they are bound by circuit court decisions. 122 Specifically,

120. Compare Werner, supra note 67, at 642-47 (arguing that the reasoning of the
court is not part of the court's decision for purposes of stare decisis), with Michael C.
Dorf, Dicta and Article Ill, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000-09 (1994) (after collecting
case law demonstrating significant confusion, arguing that the reasoning of the court is
integral to the court's decision for purposes of stare decisis).
121. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S.Ct. 2711, 2742 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (judges "know how to mouth the correct legal rules with
ironic solemnity while avoiding those rules' logical consequences.") (quotation marks
and citations omitted); see generally Caminker, supra note 70, at 819-20, (reviewing
literature documenting state and lower federal courts' attempts to evade Supreme Court
precedent).
122. These considerations also lead to the conclusion that horizontal stare decisis
should apply as between BAP panels as it does between panels of the circuit courts of
appeal. That has long been the rule in the 9th Circuit BAP. See, e.g., Ball v. Payco-
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the stability, uniformity, and legitimacy justifications support assigning

BAP decisions the same weight as circuit court opinions. Those courts
and commentators who have pointed out how the judicial economy and
efficiency justification does not support a stare decisis rule under the
current structure are correct in part, but since most of them consider only
the path-of-review justification, they err in stopping their analysis at that
point and concluding that stare decisis has no application. Likewise,
while considerations of federalism as reflected in the Rules of Decision
Act or the Constitution do not compel stare decisis, nonetheless to the
extent that the Constitution's provision of uniform rules for bankruptcy
reflects the American experience under the Articles of Confederation, the
Constitution reflects a conclusion that bankruptcy law is not an area
where diversity of the law is valued. Finally, it is unlikely that applying
stare decisis will produce hypocrisy in the bankruptcy arena any more
than in other areas of law where the doctrine is well accepted. The
following sub-sections expand on each of these points in tum.

1.

Stability

Stability-the consistent application of rules over time-is as
important in bankruptcy as in any other area of law. Many of
bankruptcy's legal rules directly affect both pre- and post-petition
behavior. For example, creditors need to know whether they may retain
funds before seeking permission to set-off. 123 Likewise, creditors and
debtors often need to know how to write agreements so that the
consequences of bankruptcy on the agreements are known and predictable.124 Most importantly, bankruptcy trustees need to know the range
of actions they are permitted or required to take to augment the estate,
run the business, and satisfy the debtor's creditors.
While instability in bankruptcy law may result from a variety of
factors and not simply from bankruptcy judges' refusal to give stare
decisis effect to district court or BAP decisions, the fact that there are

General American Credits (In re Ball), 185 B.R. 595 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (BAPs will
adhere to prior BAP opinions unless and until overruled by the Court of Appeals).
123. See Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 116 S.Ct. 286 (1995).
124. See, e.g., In re General Assoc. Investors Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. 756 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1993) (questioning whether, in financing hotel, bank's deed of trust, assignment
of lease and rents, and financing statement for debtor's resort included as security
revenue derived from rental of rooms or facilities).

I
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316 bankruptcy judgeships makes it considerably more difficult to
develop legal rules that have staying power. By the same token, the
situation becomes even less stable when more than 316 judges are
reviewed by over 649 district judges sitting in ninety-four different
district courts, none of whom are bound to follow the decisions of the
others. It is not until one arrives at the circuit court level that order is
established.
It is not only the number of judges, but also the intermediate layer of
review which adds uncertainty over whether anything will be settled.
For example, in Fiscal Year 1994 (FY94) 837,797 bankruptcy petitions
were filed, 4,892 appeals were taken to the district courts and 1,382
appeals were taken to the circuit courts. 125 During FY94, the circuit
courts disposed of 1,337 cases, 650 on their merits. 126 Interestingly,
the 1,337 dispositions resulted in 931 reported opinions. 127 Of those
931 opinions, over one third (336) came from the Ninth Circuit.
If one assumes that these numbers are also a fair reflection of the
dynamic picture-that is, that for every 840,000 petitions filed,
approximately 5,000 will ask for intermediate review and 1,400 will seek
circuit court review-then one can appreciate how, if the bankruptcy
judges were answerable directly to the circuits or a BAP in each circuit,
conflicting decisions over points of bankruptcy law could be harmonized
far more quickly within each circuit. For example, when a hotel files for
bankruptcy protection, everyone involved wants to know how to treat
post-petition room revenues. Secured lenders want those monies treated
as "rents" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code section 552 because
then the revenues will be treated as "cash collateral" under Bankruptcy
Code section 363(a), and the lenders will be entitled to certain
protections before the debtor could use the revenues. Naturally, debtors
want the monies treated as something other than rents. Before 1994, the
state of the law on this question was "incoherent" in the Ninth Circuit.128 Although a BAP had held in early 1991that the revenues were
not rents but money paid on accounts, 129 its decision did not. settle the
question because of the uncertain _stare ·decisis effect of its opinion. 130

125. 1994 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.,
Tables B-1, C-2, and F, respectively ..
126. Id. Table B-1.
,
127. Per LEXIS search of BKRTCY library, CASES file, searching for "COURT
(circuit) and DATE (aft September 30, 1993) and DATE (bef October 1, 1994)." Note
that not all cases reported on LEXIS are considered published precedent.
128. In re Hotel Sierra Vista Ltd., 112 F.3d 429, 431 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997).
129. In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. 543 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991).
130. Compare In re Thunderbird Inn, 151.B.R. 224 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993) (bound
by BAP decision), with In re General Assoc. Investors Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. at 756;
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Until Congress clarified the matter in. the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994 to include post-petition room revenues as property within the
meaning of sections 552 and 363, 131 the fact remained that neither
lenders nor borrowers could predict which rule would obtain, regardless
of the wording used in the loan security documents (deeds of trust,
etc).132
Accordingly, the stability rationale strongly supports applying stare
decisis to BAP decisions. As one jurist aptly noted:
A bankruptcy judge who feels free to disregard Appellate Panel decisions
deprives every attorney in his or her territory of the ability to predict the
outcome of a bankruptcy dispute, at least at the trial court level. It is the
attorneys, and not the judges, which make any legal system work by counseling
their clients and crafting compromises so that only a small portion of potential
disputes ever actually come before the judge for adjudication. Published court
decisions, whether favorable or unfavorable to particular position, are the tools
a competent lawyer uses in advising his or her clients. The bankruptcy judge
who refuses to feel bound by Appellate Panel decisions takes this tool away
from the attorneys and thereby harms the system. 133

2.

Uniformity

The term "uniformity" in bankruptcy is usually taken to mean
geographic uniformity, the elimination of differences in the treatment of
debtors who live in different places. One goal of the current system is
to give the same fresh start to debtors in California as to debtors in West
Virginia. The idea is to remedy the problem illustrated by early cases
in which the resident of one state was not able to gain a true fresh start

cf In re Everett Home Town Ltd., 146 B.R. 453 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (not bound by
BAP decision). Although the BAP opinion turned in part on Arizona property law, that
state's treatment of room revenues is not significantly different from other states'
treatment. See Northview Corp., 130 B.R. at 543.
131. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106. 11
U.S.C.S. §§ 363, 552 (Law. Co-op. 1997).
132. Note that this is not a situation which parties can contract around. Here, the
rule really does matter because § 552 is one of those bankruptcy provisions which alter
contractual arrangements. See, e.g., In re Thunderbird Inn, 151 B.R. at 225 (court
assuming that the trust deed contained language sufficient to bring room revenues within
the meaning of the parties' security agreement but nonetheless finding that, based on In
re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. at 543, the lender's interest in post-petition room revenues
was cut off by section 552(a), the room revenues were not "cash collateral" within the
meaning of Bankruptcy Code section 363(a), and therefore the lender was not entitled
to adequate protection from debtor's use of the revenues).
133. In re Muskin Inc., 151 B.R. 252, 255 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993).
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because that state's insolvency laws could not affect contracts made or
obligations incurred in other states. 134 Even with the extension of the
national bankruptcy laws to debtors of all sorts-businesses and
municipalities, as well as individual consumers-the application of a
"uniform" rule to diverse regimes of state property law has results that
are not uniform. Thus, the lack of uniformity in bankruptcy law, even
more than the lack of stability, is due not only to the failure of
bankruptcy judges to be bound by the BAPs, but is also caused by the
interplay of varying state law regimes with the Bankruptcy Code. 135
Reducing the number of decision-makers, however, would help reduce
the divergence of opinions and help establish uniform treatment of
debtors, just as it would increase stability. For example, consider the
proper interpretation of Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(l)(C), which
prevents a debtor from receiving a discharge for otherwise dischargeable
tax liabilities that the debtor "willfully attempted in any manner to evade
or defeat." The question is under what standard a debtor should be held
to have "willfully attempted." For over ten years courts struggled to
find a common standard of proof of willfulness. Some required proof
that measured up to the standard used in the criminal statute for felony
tax evasion. 136 Others adopted the more lenient civil standard of
willfulness, achieving opposite results on similar facts. 137
The difference in standards leads to a difference in treatment. It is
universally acknowledged that "the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is
to allow the honest debtor a fresh start." 138 But the choice of standard
can determine who does and does not fall within the category of "honest
debtors." For example, the bankruptcy court in In re Toti used the
criminal standard of willfulness to find the debtor honest, but was

134. E.g., Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. 295 (1847) (Maryland consumer debtor unable
to escape obligations to New York merchant because the discharge given under
Maryland law was ineffective as to the obligation incurred in New York).
135. One obvious example of this is seen in Bankruptcy Code § 522, which allows
a debtor to exempt out of the bankruptcy estate property that "is exempt under . . . State
or local law." Id. Thus, while all states may allow a debtor a homestead exemption,
some states (such as Texas) place no cap on the value such exemption may have,
whereas other states (such as Virginia) limit the value of the homestead exemption (as
does the available federal exemption provision in Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)).
136. See I.RC § 7201. See e.g., In re Gathwright, 102 B.R. 211 (Bankr. D. Or.
1989) (debtor's conduct in filing late returns and understating income not sufficient to
show willful intent to evade payment of taxes; court refused to consider proof of evasion
of payment).
137. See, e.g., In re Berzon, 145 B.R. 247; 252 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (debtor's
conduct in filing late returns and understating income sufficient to show a willful attempt
to evade payment of taxes); see also In re Harris, 49 B.R. 223 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985)
modified on reconsideration 59 B.R. 545 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986).
138. In re Toti, 24 F.3d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 1994).
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reversed by the district and appellate courts, who decided that debtor
honesty should be measured by the civil standard. 139 Beginning with
the appellate opinion in Toti, courts appear to have reached a consensus
that although "Congress did not intend that a failure to pay taxes,
without more, should result in the nondischargeablility of a debtor's tax
liabilities in bankruptcy," 140 the government must nonetheless prove
only that the debtor's actions were voluntary, conscious and intentional,
(as opposed to accidental), which is the civil standard of willfulness used
in such statutes as I.RC. § 6672 (the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty). 141
If BAP decisions were binding on all courts within a circuit, greater
uniformity would be achieved more quickly because the number of
decision makers would be reduced. Debtors would be less subject to
disparate treatment at the trial court level. Like the goal of stability, the
goal of uniformity supports giving circuit-wide stare decisis effect to
BAP opinions._

3.

Judicial Economy and Efficiency

The BAP is a three-judge panel which is established primarily to
review cases for errors of law. As such, it plays an identical role to the
circuit courts and possesses identical virtues of economy and efficiency:
it is a specialized tribunal with three brains at work and all parties
focused on the legal questions. To this extent, the judicial economy
rationale supports making BAP decisions binding on both bankruptcy
and district judges, who are institutionally less able to give thoughtful
consideration to the legal issues than appellate judges. 142 Moreover,
the current side-by-side system is widely viewed as incompetent to

139. In re Toti, 141 B.R. 126 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992), rev'd U.S. v. Toti, 149
B.R. 829 (E.D. Mich. 1993), aff'd In re Toti, 24 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 1994).
140. In re Haas, 48 F.3d 1153, 1157 (11th Cir. 1995).
141. See In re Birkenstock, 87 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 1996); Dalton v. IRS, 77 F.3d
1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1996) (following Toti); Matter of Bruner, 55 F.3d 195, 200 (5th
Cir. 1995) (agreeing with Toti); see also In re Sumpter, 64 F.3d 663, 76 A.F.T.R.2d (PH) 95-6408 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the words "in any manner" are broad enough
to encompass attempts, whether or not successful, to thwart the payment of taxes).
142. In re Muskin, 151 B.R. 252, 254-55 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993) ("Ego aside, there
is no good reason why a bankruptcy judge should want to spend hours struggling with
a complicated and thorny issue when three other bankruptcy judges have already done
the same thing, reached a conclusion, and published a decision for the benefit of all.").
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provide "the desired certainty of outcome." 143 As the examples given
above suggest, according circuit-wide binding effect to BAP decisions
would not only provide greater certainty and uniformity, but also
increase judicial efficiency by speeding the resolution of controversial
issues that might otherwise spend far longer "percolating" among the
bankruptcy and district courts before being addressed by one or more
circuit courts.
Undercutting these efficiency arguments, however, is the fact that the
BAPs do not necessarily lie in the path of review from bankruptcy
courts. One cannot predict that an appeal will go to a BAP. The fact
that there is no horizontal stare decisis between district judges adds even
more uncertainty to the outcome of an appeal. Therefore, according
stare decisis effect to BAP decisions will not necessarily reduce the
numbers of appeals taken, especially to the district courts. This is the
main argument that both Bankruptcy courts and commentators have used
to justify failures to follow district court and BAP decisions. 144 Since
bankruptcy judges do not know at the time they make a decision whether
it will be a BAP or a district court that will hear any appeal, and since
no district court has so far considered itself bound by a BAP, it is no
surprise that many bankruptcy judges feel free to disregard BAP
decisions. 145
As I have tried to show, however, the fact that another court will be
able to reverse a judge is not the only reason for that judge to give
binding effect to that court's decisions .. There are many other rea1sons-including reasons· of efficiency The lack of a path-of-review
justification, which itself is only part of the larger judicial efficiency

143. See Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 173 B.R. 672, 679 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that if district judges can ignore BAP interpretations in the same
way that one circuit court of appeals "respectfully disagrees" with another circuit court
of appeals, then "litigants never know what the binding interpretation of the law will be"
until the court of appeals in that circuit resolves the conflict). See also NBRC Final
Report, supra note 6, at 765 (under current view that BAP opinions cannot create
binding precedent, "BAPs may actually accelerate the divergence of views on various
legal questions").
·
·
144. See, e.g., March & Obregon, supra note 5; First of Amer. Bank v. Gaylord (In
re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236, 242 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991). One can expect this argument
to be made even more forcefully in those circuits, such as the Second Circuit, where
BAPs have been adopted by only some of the judicial districts.
145. See State of Or. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. v. Selden (In re Selden), 121
B.R. 59 (D. Or. 1990) (using path-of-review rationale to hold that BAP opinion in case
arising from Central District of California was not binding on bankruptcy court in
District of Oregon). But see Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 173 B.R.
672 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding BAP decision binding circuit-wide despite path-ofreview rationale because "there is no reason that both the BAP and the district court
appellate decisions must have identical [e]ffect, authority, or jurisdiction").
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rationale for stare decisis, is not sufficient cause to reject the doctrine's
application to BAP decisions without examining the extent to which
other justifications apply. Moreover, if district courts were bound by
BAP decisions, the lack of direct review of district court opinions by
BAPs would be of even less importance. I discuss this intriguing
possibility in Part IV.
4.

Judicial Legitimacy

By refusing to accord stare decisis effect to BAP decisions, bankruptcy
courts impair their legitimacy "as a source of impersonal and reasoned
judgments." 146 One bankruptcy judge chastised his colleagues for
doing so:
[I]t is in my opinion wrong, and in some sense shameful, for a bankruptcy
judge to feel free to disregard an Appellate Panel decision in the absence of a
conflicting ruling by the district court. When a bankruptcy judge disregards an
Appellate Panel decision on his or her own, merely because he or she disagrees
with it, that bankruptcy judge is letting his or her ego interfere with the system
itself. 147

The self-restraint problem can be especially acute in areas of the law,
such as bankruptcy, where the process is seen as primarily equitable in
scope. Bankruptcy judges are called upon to do equity between
competing concerns, constantly balancing the debtor's interest in a fresh
start with the creditors' interest in fair treatment. 148 While the problem

146. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 852 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147. In re Muskin, 151 B.R. at 254 (Jaroslovsky, J.). Judge Jaroslovsky's
enthusiasm for stare decisis was sorely tested in a later case, Stokes v. Vierra, 173 B.R.
417, 418 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994), remanded 185 B.R. 341 (N.D. Cal. 1995), where the
judge reluctantly decided he was bound to follow a BAP opinion (a 2-1 panel split, no
less) with which he strongly disagreed. The district court did not express an opinion on
the stare decisis question, however, because it did not think the bankruptcy court had
read the BAP opinion correctly; it remanded the case for further proceedings in light of
its interpretation of the BAP opinion.
148. In fact, at least one circuit has held that it is precisely the equitable nature of
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction which, when a creditor files a claim before the
bankruptcy court, destroys that creditor's "right to adjudicate before a jury any issue that
bears directly on the allowance of that claim." Germain v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 988
F.2d 1323, 1329 (2d Cir. 1993) ("It is reasonable that a creditor or debtor who submits
to the equity jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court thereby waives any right to a jury trial
for the resolution of disputes vital to the bankruptcy process . . . and does so not so
much on a theory of waiver as on the theory that the legal issue has been converted to
an issue of equity.").
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in today's world is often thought to be that bankruptcy judges are too
pro-debtor, they have not always been so. A prominent jurist of the last
century expressed a very different sentiment:
I would go to any length, short of doing violence to the plainly expressed will
of the legislature, in so construing a [bankruptcy] statute as not to give the least
countenance to that lax morality in relation to the payment of debts which is
now beginning to disgrace sovereign States, as well as individuals and private
corporations. 1

Precisely because judges are subject to human passions and prejudices,
stare decisis provides a mechanism to limit the extent to which each
judge imposes his or her own moral vision, whether pro-debtor or procreditor, on the bankruptcy world.
B.

Of Round Holes and Square Pegs:
The Constitutional Problem

The Supreme Court thought that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
violated the separation of powers doctrine. The gist of the plurality's
opinion in Marathon was that
28 U.S.C. § 1471 ... has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of the
essential attributes of the judicial power from the Art. III district court, and has
vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of jurisdiction
cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to create adjuncts to Art.
III courts. 150

I submit that, strictly from an examination of the various justifications
for stare decisis, it follows clearly that BAP decisions should be binding
on all bankruptcy courts within a circuit. Since both BAPs and
bankruptcy courts are composed of the same judges appointed under
Article I, there is little constitutional concern about that idea-a round
peg fits into a round hole. It is also clear, as I hope I have shown,
purely from what would best promote the ideas behind stare decisis, that
the BAP decisions should be binding on the district courts. However,
round pegs fit square holes only poorly: there might be constitutional
concerns about requiring district court Article III judges to obey legal
rulings issued by Article I judges. If BAP decisions were binding on
district courts, then district courts would be in the uncomfortable
position of having to defer to one set of Article I courts (the BAPs) on
the law and to another set of Article I courts (the bankruptcy courts) on
the facts (as to core matters, at least). At first blush, this would seem
to raise the same problems that concerned the Marathon court. The
149.
150.
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Ninth Circuit certainly thought so in Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis:
"On the other hand, it must be conceded that BAP decisions cannot bind
the district courts themselves. As article III courts, the district courts
must always be free to decline to follow BAP decisions and to formulate
their own rules within their jurisdiction." 151
However, a closer look at what concerned the Marathon court suggests
that BAP decisions may indeed be able to bind district courts, even
under the current structure, without offending the constitution. The issue
in Marathon was whether an Article I trial court could, because its
decision was subject to review of the law by an Article III court, be
permitted to adjudicate a purely state law claim. Here, in contrast, the
issue is whether an Article I appellate court can, without violating the
constitutionally protected separation of powers, create binding legal rules
to which an Article III court must apply the facts, whether those facts
were found by the bankruptcy court or by the district court acting in its
capacity as a trial court. A close examination of the relationship
between bankruptcy trial courts and BAPs supports the argument that
BAPs may constitutionally create legal rules that are binding on at least
those district courts in a circuit which have consented to BAP review (a
weak assertion of stare decisis effect), and possibly on all district courts
in a circuit (the strong assertion of stare decisis effect that would be the
more desirable rule). The constitutionality of both assertions of the stare
decisis effect rests upon the argument that BAPs depend for their
existence upon the Article III courts which create them. Ultimately the
situation reduces to Article III courts binding Article III courts. 152
The weak assertion relies on the requirement of district court consent.
Recall that the BAFJA made two critical changes to the BAP structure:
151. 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990)
152. Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Co.), 149 B.R.
614 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993). While I believe that Rigoberto Obregon is correct that
Judge Bufford's conclusion that BAPs are adjuncts of the circuit courts is wrong, see
Rigoberto V. Obregon, In re Globe Illumination Co.: A Provocative But Flawed Theory
on the Precedential Value of BAP Authority, 21 CAL. BANKR. J. 45 (1993), Obregon
does not, in my view, give adequate weight to the difference between the institutional
function of the BAP as an appellate tribunal and the bankruptcy court as a trial tribunal.
That is indeed a distinction with a difference; just because the BAPs are not "true"
adjuncts of the circuit courts as they were supposed to be under the compromise
legislation offered by the House prior to the enactment of the BRA, it does not follow
that the BAPs do not perform the same institutional function-to say what the law is.
That is quite different from a trial court's function-to find the facts and apply the law
to them.
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first, that the parties must consent to BAP jurisdiction and, second, that
the district courts must have voted to allow a BAP to operate. To the
extent that the constitutional legitimacy of the BAP under the current
structure depends upon district court consent, then it does no constitutional violence for BAP decisions to bind those districts which have
accepted BAPs review.
The reasoning behind the strong assertion of stare decisis effect is that
BAPs do not remove the "essence of judicial power" from either the
district or circuit courts. As far as district courts are concerned, the
"essence of judicial power" is the power to find the facts at trial. The
undermining of that power is what the Supreme Court found unconstitutional about the BRA in Marathon; and that is what the constitutional
debate over the structure of the bankruptcy system has continued to be
about. Specifically, the Supreme Court has said that, regardless of an
issue's classification as core or non-core, if the issue presents a
controversy which entitles the litigants to resolution by a jury trial, the
Bankruptcy Code cannot operate to deprive the litigants of that right. 153
However, the question that Marathon left open and lower courts have
not yet resolved, is whether bankruptcy courts are either statutorily
empowered or constitutionally able to conduct jury trials. 154 This
controversy demonstrates that concerns about the separation of powers
are highest at the fact-finding level. The essence of judicial power at
that level is the control of the fact-finding process. The BAPs do not
remove the fact-finding function from the district courts. Under the
current structure, they are never even in the position of reviewing district
courts' findings of fact.
Nor do the BAPs impermissibly interfere with the circuit courts'
function. The essence of judicial power at the appellate level is the
power to ascertain the law. As Chief Justice Marshall put it, the
function of the reviewing court is "to say what the law is." 155 The
BAPs do not remove this power of interpretation from the circuits. A
BAP is a creation of the circuit court; its judges are appointed by the
circuit court; and its decision in. any given case is fully reviewable by
the circuit court, should the parties appeal.
Thus, for BAPs to play the role of a corrector of legal errors should
not trigger separation of powers concerns about either district or circuit
courts. BAP decisions may, without offending the Constitution, bind

153. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
154. Compare Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper), 896
F.2d 1394, 1403 (2d Cir. 1990) (yes to both), with Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates, (In re
Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380, 389 (10th Cir. 1990) (no to the first).
155. See Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1984).
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both bankruptcy and district courts. To implement such a stare decisis
regime the circuit court would have to announce and implement the rule,
either through administrative action or through case law. Such action
would not violate the separation of powers doctrine under the current
statutory scheme because, first, there is no practical danger of Congressional or Executive manipulation of the legal rules in any particular case
and, second, it would be entirely appropriate in principle for Congress,
should it not like the legal rules concerning bankruptcy established by
the courts, to change those rules pursuant to its Article I mandate to
create uniform bankruptcy rules. 156 In fact, under the current structure,
since BAPs do not review any district court decisions, there would be no
danger of BAPs reversing district courts on application of law to facts
in any specific case. 157
V.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT STRUCTURE

The reasons behind stare decisis support making BAP decisions
binding on both bankruptcy and district courts. That BAPs should bind
bankruptcy courts causes no constitutional concern. However, the idea
of BAPs binding district courts will surely generate concerns that have
political, if not constitutional legitimacy. District judges may resist a
perceived reduction in their power, just as they have resisted the dilution
of their positions by the creation of Article III bankruptcy courts. 158
The obvious theoretical solution is for Congress to scrap the current
Rube Goldberg bankruptcy appellate structure, establish bankruptcy

156. As discussed supra notes 128-132. and accompanying text, this is precisely
what Congress did in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 as to the hotel room revenue
problem. Of course, in that example, the courts did not come up with a uniform or
stable rule and Congress stepped in. But the point is that no constitutional difference
exists between an Article III court being bound by a BAP-created legal rule that room
revenues were "cash collateral" or the same rule written in the statute by Congress.
157. However, since BAPs create legal rules in the context of deciding specific
cases and do not "say what the law is" in the same way administrative agencies
promulgate interpretative regulations, I doubt that an argument could be constructed that
BAP conclusions of law should be binding for exactly the same reasons agencies'
regulations are binding.
158. Nor is it entirely clear that bankruptcy judges want Article III status. See New
NCBJ President Officer Views on Consumer Filings, Chapter 12, BAPs, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Oct. 1996, at 7-8 ("It is my belief that if you took a poll of all 325 bankruptcy
judges and asked them about it, it would be about 80/20 saying 'Thank you, no.' [to
becoming Article III judges]").
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courts as Article III courts and provide for a single appeal as of right to
an appellate tribunal. Many commentators agree on that much, though
specifics differ. Some have proposed routing all bankruptcy appeals to
a single Article III appellate court with national jurisdiction; others
suggest routing them tthrough an already existing tribunal like the
Federal Circuit. 159 Others argue against a specialized tribunal, fearing
that the loss of a generalist supervisory court would result in inferior
"law declaration." 160 The National Bankruptcy Review Commission
has thrown its considerable weight behind the idea that all appeals
should go directly from bankruptcy courts to the existing Circuit
Courts. 161 For the following reasons, I offer an idea which resonates'
with those who favor a specialized review court: make the BAPs true
adjuncts of the circuit courts-just as bankruptcy courts are adjuncts of
the district courts-and do so regardless of whether Congress decides to
give bankruptcy judges Article III status.
Although the legislative history of the BAP provisions is sparse, one
of the more intriguing recommendations made in 1973 by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws to Congress was to disallow appeals
directly from the bankruptcy courts to the circuit courts. This recommendation should be given renewed consideration. Much of bankruptcy
work is equitable in nature. As suggested above, the ideas behind stare
decisis do not apply as well to issues which center on equitable
determinations (the application of broad standards) as they do to issues
centered on application of legal rules. Quite to the contrary, courts
reviewing controversies in equity routinely defer to the courts who are
closest to the action. Thus, although the Commission's concern was that
the physical "remoteness" of the courts of appeals would discourage
appeals, 162 it is also true that a circuit court's "remoteness" from the
day-to-day concerns of the bankruptcy world may detract from the
quality and sensitivity of its review.
The BAPs are a commendable compromise between a reviewing court
that is "too remote" and a trial court that is "too close to the action."
On the one hand, the bankruptcy judges who comprise a BAP are well

159. See Nathan B. Feinstein, The Bankruptcy System: Proposal to Restructure The
Bankruptcy Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Processes, in 1995-1996 ANNUAL SURVEY
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 517 (William J. Norton, Jr., ed., 1995); Daniel J. Bussel, Power,
Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063
(1994).
160. See Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of
Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or An Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 537-39 (1995).
161. NBRC Final Report, supra note 6, at 752.
162. See Report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
H.R. Doc. No. 95-137, at 96 (1973).
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aware of the actual, practical impact of its legal decisions at the trial and
administrative level. On the other hand, a BAP has the inst.itutional
advantages of an appeals court: its judges sit as colleagues in a panel of
three; they are adequately briefed on the legal issues; and they are free
from the distraction of having to manage the bankruptcy case itself. The
conclusion of the only study of the BAP work product was that "the
Panels are generally well-regarded by Ninth Circuit attorneys with
bankruptcy appellate experience. The attorneys respond particularly
favorably to procedural and qualitative aspects of the Panels' operations."163 If possible, the BAPs should be retained because they are
a good idea.
The NBRC proposes to eliminate the BAPs because it associates the
BAPs with a two-tiered appellate system and cannot conceive of a role
for BAPs in a single-tiered system. 164 That is, the NBRC's chief
concern is that an intermediate level of appeal is one bite too many; it
causes litigants delay and expense without adding value to the system.
Few would dispute that point. As I hope I have shown, however, such
a flaw does not inhere in a two-tiered appellate scheme. If BAP
opinions are given binding effect throughout the circuit, many of the illeffects described by the NBRC would be ameliorated. More importantly, it does not necessarily follow that in order to eliminate intermediate
appeals one must also eliminate the BAPs. I suggest that the BAPs
could be retained while intermediate appellate review was eliminated, so
that litigants get only one appeal as of right. All that would require is
that Judge Bufford's analysis of BAPs as adjuncts to the circuit courts
in In re Globe Illumination became reality. 165
The idea is to assume that bankruptcy courts retain Article I status,
and that district courts retain their close supervisory powers and their
ability to remove any matter from the bankruptcy courts' consideration.
Then, in each circuit a Bankruptcy Appellate Service ("BAS") could be
created as an adjunct to the circuit courts. Its judges would be appointed
by the circuit court from among the active bankruptcy judges. From the
BAS, three-member panels of bankruptcy judges (still "BAPs") would
be drawn. Appeals from the decisions of the trial court (either a

163. Bermant & Sloan, supra note 59, at 217.
164. NBRC Final Report, supra note 6, at 764-67 (analyzing BAPs as part of the
problems posed by intermediate review).
165. See supra note 152.
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bankruptcy court deciding a core matter, or a district court that had
either withdrawn the reference or reviewed a non-core matter) would go
directly to the circuit level. There would be no district court review and
no intermediate level of review as of right. At the discretion of the
circuit, an appeal could then be referred to a BAP, or not. Circuits
could choose the extent to which referrals were to be made; they could
create automatic referrals, perhaps for all core matters, while they
retained the power in any given case to withdraw the reference at any
time. (In this, their procedure would be similar to the handling of
referrals by the district courts.) A litigant seeking to reverse any adverse
BAP decision could be permitted to petition the circuit court for a writ
of certiorari. The circuit would have discretion to accept or deny
review. However, where the BAP certified that its decision created a
conflict with another circuit, circuit review could be mandatory. In cases
where review was denied or its outcome unfavorable, the litigant could
then petition the Supreme Court for review as under current practice.
Under this scheme, the BAPs would be adjuncts to the circuit courts,
but would retain their Article I status. The terms of bankruptcy judges
appointed by the circuits would still be limited and their salaries would
have no constitutional protection against diminution. 166 The Article I
character of the BAS, however, ought not to raise separation of powers
concerns. To begin with, such concerns are far weaker at the appellate
level than at the trial level, as seen in the review of post-Marathon case
law above. As a practical matter, it is difficult to find a separation of
powers objection to the arrangement: the BAS would be well insulated
from either legislative or administrative pressures. Nor would there be
a theoretical breach: the circuit courts would retain ultimate power to say
what the law is. Moreover, the history surrounding the adoption of the
Constitution also suggests that such an arrangement would not
impermissibly blend constitutional powers. As mentioned above, the
idea of separation of powers was of great concern to those who wrote
the Constitution. James Madison devoted a series of the Federalist
essays "to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty
requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and
distinct." 167 In that series, Madison reviewed to what extent the state
constitutions of the time addressed the separation of powers issue. For
example, Madison concluded that New York's state Constitution made

166. One provision of each judge's employment contract could be that no reduction
in salary could take place during the appointment. While this would not suffice to make
bankruptcy courts Article III courts, it would reduce concern that this scheme encroaches
on the judicial sphere of action.
167. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
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"no declaration on this subject, but appears very clearly to have been
framed with an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different
departments." 168 Madison reached this conclusion even though the
court of last resort in New York, at that time called the Court for the
Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Error (CCE), was composed of
the three justices of the Supreme Court, the Chancellor, and the entire
thirty-two members of the New York senate. This court existed for the
first seventy years of the Republic; it was abolished in 1846. It
produced a substantial body of law, some of which is. good law even
today. 169 One reason why Madison and others would not have been
concerned about this .arrangement is that the CCE was not set up to try
cases. Its function, as its title implies, was merely to correct errors made
by courts (such as the New York Supreme Court) in trying cases. Its
purpose was to address and settle only those cases "presenting great and
novel questions which will occasionally arise under any judicial system,
where the ordinary courts after the fullest argument and scrutiny fail to
satisfy the public or the parties in interest." 170 In short, it performed
solely an appellate legal error correction function. Its decisions were
binding on both the Supreme Court (and all lower courts of law) as well
as on the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellors (the courts of equity). The
CCE's function as an appellate court triggered separation of powers
concerns only when it became embroiled in a series of constitutional
controversies, at which time the difficulty of having the same people
who had enacted a statute pass upon its constitutionality became
apparent. 171 No such concern is raised by making the BAPs adjuncts
to the circuit. courts. As outlined above, such an action would not
remove the essence of the circuit courts' power to determine the law.

168. Id. at 305.
169. For example, Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826) was discussed in at
least one first-year property casebook as a leading case on constructive eviction as of
1984. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY (1984).
170. Charles O'Connor, in REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
697 (William G. Bishop & William H. Attree, eds.) (The Evening Atlas 1846).
171. See generally Camp, supra note 112.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The reasons behind the stare decisis doctrine strongly support both
bankruptcy courts and district courts giving full precedential effect to
BAP decisions. Under the current structure, it is clear that circuit courts
could take administrative action to require this result for bankruptcy
courts. While the power of the circuit courts to implement such a rule
for district courts admits of doubt, there is nonetheless a respectable
argument for the constitutional soundness of a circuit court rule requiring
district courts to obey legal rules established by BAP decisions. To the
extent that the system can be reformed, rules permitting two appeals as
of right from a trial decision should be abolished and BAPs should be
reformed as circuit court adjuncts. If bankruptcy court judges are given
Article III status, then no constitutional concern arises from any type of
review structure. However, the potential political problems facing such
reform are considerable. An alternative is the idea of creating a
Bankruptcy Appellate Service and making BAPs adjuncts to the circuit
courts. Even as Article I courts, the BAPs could then continue to
contribute to the development of bankruptcy law without running afoul
of the constitutional command to reserve the essence of judicial power
to Article III courts.
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